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The objective of this study is to detennine Pakistan's place in contemporary U.S.
national security strategy. Today, U.S.-Pakistan relations are strained due to the Pressler
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler Amendment prohibits arms
transfers from the United States to Pakistan in response to Pakistani efforts to develop
a nuclear weapon capability. This thesis provides a historical background to the current
impasse by examining Pakistani foreign policy since 1947. Next, the study examines the
evolution ofU.S. interests and security objectives in South And Southwest Asia. Current
security objectives analyzed are the U.S. strategies to contain Iran and Iraq and to
prevent nuclear proliferation in the region. In order to attain security objectives in the
region, the author concludes that the U. S. needs a close cooperative relationship with
Pakistan. Since the Pressler Amendment stands as the greatest obstacle to improved
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The objective of this study is to determine Pakistan's appropriate place in
contemporary U.S. national security strategy. Today, U.S.-Pakistan relations are
strained due to the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler
Amendment prohibits arms transfers from the United States to Pakistan in response to
Pakistan's development of a nuclear weapon capability. U.S.-Pakistan relations are
strained because historically, Pakistan has measured the depth of relations with the
United States by the amount ofmilitary aid the United States could supply to Pakistan.
This thesis provides a historical background to the current impasse by examining
Pakistani foreign policy since 1947. Next, the study examines the evolution ofD.S.
interests and security objectives in South And Southwest Asia. Current security
objectives analyzed are the U. S. strate.gies to contain Iran and Iraq and to prevent
nuclear proliferation in the region.
The historical animosity between India and Pakistan created a South Asian cold war
that coincided with the beginnings ofthe U.S.-Soviet cold war. Throughout the U.S.-Soviet
cold war, Pakistan sought alignments with other countries to gain military and economic aid
to deter aggression from the militarily superior India. Pakistan played a pragmatic game of
swvival shifting alignments and alliances between the United States, China and the Islamic
countries of Southwest Asia.
In the 1950's Pakistan quickly became an ally ofthe United States in Washington's
strategy to contain communism. As a member ofboth SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan
became the linchpin ofU.S. efforts to defend the Middle East and deny Soviet
encroachment into South Asia. The U.S.-Pakistan alliance was undermined as the United
States sought balanced ties with both India and Pakistan in the 1960s. This shift in U.S.
policy was evident when the United States increased economic and military aid to India to
deflect a growing Soviet influence in the region. The Pakistanis saw increased aid to India as
a direct threat to the survival ofPakistan. To counter a stronger India, Pakistan sought close
relations with India's enemy, China. Throughout the 1960s, Pakistan received military aid
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and political support from China, as Pakistan acted as a regional balancer to Chinese
perceptions ofSoviet eXPansion in Asia.
After the 1971 Bangladesh war, Pakistan became disillusioned with the United States
and China, both ofwhom did not intervene militarily to prevent India from dismembering
Pakistan. Pakistan turned to the Islamic states of Southwest Asia, as the OPEC nations
proved themselves capable of strangling the western economies. As the preeminent military
power in the Islamic world, Pakistan Provided the OPEC countries with contract military
personnel to train their armies in the operation and maintenance of modem weapon systems.
In return, Pakistan received fmancial aid from the OPEC nations to purchase weapons on the
open market..
When India detonated its nuclear explosive device in 1974, Pakistan asked for, but
was denied a nuclear guarantee from the United States in the case ofa nuclear attack from
India. With few options left in the face of a nuclear threat from India, Pakistan started a
nuclear weapons Program. The nuclear option offered Pakistan two critical incentives to
strengthen its defense against Indian aggression. First, the nuclear option afforded Pakistan
a means to deter aggression from any militarily superior rival. Second, Pakistan felt that a
nuclear weapon capability would end the vicious cycle ofdependence on external sources of
arms supply.
u.s. pressure on human rights issues and concerns that Pakistan was developing a
nuclear weapon plagued U.S.-Pakistan relations in the late 1970's. When the Soviet Union
invaded Mghanistan in 1979, Pakistan was able to fmd a place once again in u.s.
containment policy. By supporting the Mghan Mujahideen in their fight against the Soviets,
Pakistan once again found economic and military aid from the United States.
Congressional suspicion that Pakistan, in spite ofU.S. military aid, was still seeking to
develop a nuclear weapon resulted in the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act. In order for Pakistan to receive U.S. military and economic aid, the Pressler
Amendment required that the president annually certify that Pakistan does not possess a
nuclear explosive device. As the Soviets withdrew from Mghanistan, the U.S. no longer
viewed Pakistan as a front-line state against communist aggression requiring military aid. In
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1990, President Bush could not certify Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon capability,
cutting offU.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan.
With the Soviet withdrawal from Mghanistan and the end of the cold war, Pakistan
faces new challenges in its quest for security. The end of the cold war has not decreased
tensions between India and Pakistan. In the mid and late 1980's, India and Pakistan twice
came close to war over border tensions. The two countries remain deadlocked over the
status ofKashmir. And both countries now seek ballistic missile capabilities to deliver
nuclear warheads in the event ofanother war.
Pakistan is currently seeking better relations with the United States and hoping to
reverse the devastating impact ofthe Pressler Amendment on the material readiness of its
conventional forces. On the nuclear issue, Pakistan has offered to move in conjunction with
India toward u.s. nuclear nonproliferation goals, attempting to divert U.S. nonproliferation
pressure toward India. Pakistan once again is trying to find a place in U.S. national security
strategy, by portraying itself as a moderate, democratic, Islamic state whose geostrategic
location at the tri-junction ofSouth Asia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf intimately ties
U.S. regional interests and objectives to the future ofPakistan.
Pakistan is also looking to deepen its ties with the Peoples Republic ofChina (PRC),
who recently have downplayed their political support for Pakistan. Without a Soviet threat in
the region, China is increasingly looking at the economic potential ofIndia. China and India
are working to reach an agreement concerning the disputed Sino-Indian border while
increasing bilateral trade.
Finally, Pakistan is trying to build strategic depth by looking to the Central Asian
Republics (CAR) and the Middle East. The CAR along with Iran and Turkey offer Pakistan
a regional grouping to enhance economic growth ofthese Muslim states, while building a
regional grouping ofpolitical support based in the commonality ofIslam. Pakistan seeks to
serve the CAR interests with commercial infrastructure through Pakistan to the Indian
Ocean, that will allow these emerging markets access to Europe and the Far East.
U.S. interests and security objectives in the region have shifted from the containment
ofcommunism to the containment ofIran and Iraq and the prevention ofnuclear
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proliferation in the region. Pakistan's location at the tri-juncture of South Asia, Central Asia
and the Persian Gulf figures prominently in two critical US. national security objectives in
the region. One stated objective is to cap, reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons from both
India and Pakistan that could prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Present U.S.
strategy to attain this objective has shifted from trying to get India and Pakistan to move in
unison, toward trying to pressure Pakistan to make a unilateral move to cap its program as a
first step to break the deadlock.
The Department ofDefense (DoD) also seeks to contain the governments ofIran
and Iraq. To protect US. interests in the region, DoD's present strategy is supported by five
pillars. These include: forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, power
projection capability from the US. and readiness to fight. Security assistance depends on
the United States ability to improve the defense capabilities ofregional friends. This concept
includes: foreign military sales, foreign military fmancing, International Military Education
and Training and mobile training and technical assistance teams.
The Pressler Amendment barring transfers or sales ofarms from the United States to
Pakistan undermines US. national security strategy in the region. The Pressler Amendment
prioritizes nuclear nonproliferation goals above the regional security imperatives and
objectives that have come to the forefront ofUS. national security strategy since the end of
the cold war. U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to unilaterally renounce nuclear weapons
appear destined to fail. The security threat from India still persists. The underlying motives
for Pakistan to choose a nuclear option in the first place remain intact. Only the
modernization and improvement ofPakistan's conventional military capabilities to deter
Indian aggression may provide the impetus Pakistan requires to unilaterally move toward
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals.
US. and Chinese efforts to improve relations with India are based on the size and
potential ofthe Indian economy. This emphasis, which both the United States and China
wish to cultivate disregards the geostrategic importance ofPakistan to U.S. national security
strategy in the Middle East concerning containment ofIran and Iraq. Serving as the eastern
flank to this containment strategy, Pakistan could become a frontline state once again for the
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United States. Pressler undermines Pakistan's participation as a friendly nation, since the
United States would be unable to provide security assistance to a level which would allow
Pakistan to become an effective member in this cooperative defense agreement. The
Pressler Amendment effectively has moved Pakistan closer to Iran risking the creation of a
anti western bloc ofcountries near the entrance ofthe Persian Gulf. IfPakistan moves closer
to Iran, the risk ofnuclear weapon technology transfer to Iran also increases.
The Pressler Amendment should be repealed. In order to achieve national security
objectives in the region, the United States requires close cooperative relations with Pakistan. .
Barring U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan undermines cooperative relations and isolates
Pakistan in the region. Instead ofisolating Pakistan, the United States needs to elevate
Pakistan into a more regional leadership role in support ofU.S. national security interests and





In South Asia, the post-cold war era offers the United States unique challenges and
opportunities to achieve national security objectives. The United States once again is assessing its
relations with Pakistan in the contextofpost-coldwar security objectives in SouthAsiaand the Persian
Gulf region. In the span ofa decade, U.S. security objectives have changed from containment of
communism to contaimnent ofIran and Iraq and nuclear nonproliferation in the region. Historically,
Pakistan has measured the depth ofU.S.-Pakistan relations by the amount ofmilitaIy aid the U.S.
could supply Pakistan. Within this context, the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA) has severely strained U.S.-Pakistan relations in the post-cold war era.
The Pressler Amendment prohibits arms transfers from the United States to Pakistan in
response to Pakistan's development ofa nuclear weapon capability. Since sanctions were invoked
against Pakistan in 1990, the Pressler Amendment has beco~e the center ofa controversial debate
concerning U.S. strategies to achieve national security objectives in South and Southwest Asia.
The debate centers on whether U.S. arms transfers or sanctions can best influence Pakistan.
Many in the U.S. Congress feel that supplying arms to Pakistan would undermine U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation efforts throughout the world. Others in Congress feel that arms transfers could be
a useful tool to build closer relations with Pakistan. The executive branchviews closer relations with
Pakistan as critical to a U.S. security strategy of supporting moderate Islamic democracies, bolstering
Pakistan's ability to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and facilitate cooperative drug
interdiction and counterterrorism efforts with the United States.
The debate hinges on two fundamental issues that the executive branch and the majority of
Congress can not reach a consensus. First, are U.S. interests in the region so critical that the U.S.
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should make an exception in Pakistan's case and retreat from its stated goals and policies concerning
nuclear nonproliferation? Second, due to the historical animosity between India and Pakistan, do
U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan heighten tensions between India and Pakistan, creating a more
unstable and dangerous South Asia? These issues are not new in US.-Pakistan relations, but rather
they reflect US. foreign policy experiences in South Asia since India and Pakistan became
independent states in 1947.
As the United States reevaluates its relations with Pakistan to achieve regional security and
nuclear nonproliferation objectives, the cold war legacy ofUS.-Pakistan relations weighs heavily in
many analyst minds. The legacy of U.S.-Pakistan relations during the cold war varies from being
perceived as a zero sum game, to one of~astedUS. resources when analyzed in the context ofthe
Indo-Pak relations. US. Secretary ofDefense William Perry recently characterized US. cold war
relations in the subcontinent as a no-win situation. Due to the historical animosity and tension
between India and Pakistan, Perry stated that when American relations warmed with either India or
Pakistan they automatically had to cool with the otheL l During the cold war, the United States
chose a national security strategy of providing military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan
at different times to bolster their individual defense capabilities to deter communist encroachment into
South Asia. Due to India's persistent desire ofremaining nonaligned from either the United States
or the Soviet Union, the majority of US. aid went to Pakistan. The militarily inferior Pakistanis
offered the United States a reliable ally in the region in a quest to receive US. military aid that would
enable Pakistan to reach military parity with the larger India. While the U.S. foreign policy reflected
1 Prepared remarks of William 1. Perry to the Foreign Policy Association, "Establishing
strong Security Ties With India and Pakistan, II Defense Issues 1o-no.1 0 (31 Jan 1995).
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a global threat ofcommunism, India and to a greater degree Pakistan looked to the other side of the
Indo-Pak border as the greatest threat to their national security. Within this context, both India and
Pakistan saw u.s. military and economic aid channelled to their regional adversary as a direct threat
to the territorial integrity of their respective countries.
Due to the irretractability of the Indo-Pak dispute, the United States often chose to pursue
close relations with either Pakistan or India at the expense of the other. Motives for fundamental
shifts in U.S. policy were in response to the greater threat that the Soviet Union posed to South Asia
and the Middle East. Robert McMahon, at one extreme ofanalyzing cold war U.S. relations in the
context ofthe Indo-Pak dispute, describes the U.S.-Pakistan alliance of 1954 as consummating U.S.
foreign policy failure in South Asia. McMahon argues that by enlisting Pakistan into its anti-
communist defense network in the early years of the cold war, the United States exacerbated Indo-
Pak tensions by bringing the cold war to South Asia. By arming Pakistan, the United States triggered
an Indo-Pak arms race that caused regional instability. The United States used Pakistan as a cold war
pawn to contain an illusory communist threat. Within this framework, McMahon and the Asia
Society prescribe that the United States in the post cold war era follow a foreign policy strategy of
balanced ties to both India and Pakistan to reduce tension between the two bringing regional stability
to South Asia. 2
When analyzed outside of the context of Indo-Pak relations, one author feels that U.S.
relations with Pakistan during the cold war were beneficial to the United States. Shinn Tahir-Kheli,
a one time professor at the U.S. Army War College, asserts U.S. efforts to seek balanced relations
2 Robert J. McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and
Pakistan. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 342-343 and The Asia Society, South
Asia and the United States: After the Cold War (The Asia Society: New York, 1994),6.
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with India and Pakistan are doomed to fail. Tahir-Kheli states that ifPakistan is considered by the
United States as part of Southwest Asia, U. S. geostrategic interests favor preserving the territorial
integrity ofPakistan giving rise to Pakistan as a greater priority over India in U.S. strategic thought.3
Within this context, Pakistan's geostrategic location will always weigh heavily in U.S. foreign policy
formulation as long as the United States national security interests and objectives are focused in
Southwest Asia, particularly the Persian Gulf region.
While the debate continues concerning whether U.S. foreign policy in South Asia during the
cold war served long term U.S. interests in the region, one absolute ofIndo-Pak relations remains
after the end of the cold war. Since the partition ofIndia in 1947, Pakistan has been involved in a
South Asian cold war with India. Pakistan's perception of an Indian threat to the territorial integrity
and survival ofPakistan has persisted within and after the end ofthe U.S.-Soviet cold war. Pakistan's
foreign policy strategy from independence to the present has been based on the perceived need to
align with other countries. Through alignments and alliances, Pakistan has found throughout time
the necessary economic and military aid to strive for military parity with India and gain political
support to deter Indian aggression, insuring survival of the Pakistani state.
A. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
The objective ofthis study is to determine Pakistan's appropriate place in present-day U.S.
national security strategy. To determine a prescription for U.S.- Pakistan relations, this thesis
presents a case study of Pakistan foreign relations since 1947. This case study which highlights
Pakistani perceptions is mirrored by current U.S. interests and security objectives in the region. This
3 Sharin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution ofan Influence
Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1982), 160-161.
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methodology is chosen to answer four questions. First, what were the conditions that historically
caused Pakistan to shift and maintain alignments with the United States, China and the Islamic states
of Southwest Asia during the cold war? Second, with the end of the cold war, how have Pakistani
security objectives changed? Third, how have U.S. interests and objectives changed in the region?
Last, what advantage does re-inclusion ofPakistan in the U.S. national security strategy offer, in light
ofwhat Pakistan would require from the United States to be an ally once again for the United States?
The answer to these questions will be used to form a conclusion as to whether the Pressler
Amendment impedes attainment of national security objectives in South and Southwest Asia.
Chapter I of this study explores the roots of Pakistan's national security strategy and the
emergence of a South Asian cold war coinciding with the beginnings of the U.S.-Soviet cold war.
This section explains how Pakistan operated independently of the ideologically based U.S.-Soviet
cold war system to insure its territorial integrity against Indian aggression. During this time, Pakistani
balance ofpower considerations vis-a-vis the militarily superior India drove Pakistan to seek a place
in the national security strategy ofthe United States, China and the Islamic States of Southwest Asia
in a quest to achieve military parity with India.
Chapter II explains how the regional balance of power has changed as a result of the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The absence of a Soviet threat in the region has brought into question the
advantage that close relations with Pakistan had to offer toward both China and U. S. security
interests in the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union has also offered Pakistan a chance for
diplomatic relations and economic integration with the newly independent Central Asian Republics
(CAR). As the threat against Pakistan from India remains constant, Pakistan is presently trying to
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deepen ties with both China and the Islamic states ofSouthwest Asia while trying to revive a severely
strained relationship with the United States.
Chapter ill ofthis study considers how U.S. national security strategy and objectives in South
and Southwest Asia have changed. Specifically, two objectives and strategies will be addressed. The
first objective in South Asia concerns nuclear nonproliferation. Faced with a nuclear stalemate in
South Asia, the United States is attempting to formulate a strategy to induce Pakistan to cap its
nuclear program. The second objective concerns containing Iran and Iraq. United States Central
Command (CENTCOM) has developed a strategy of U.S. military cooperation and interoperability
with the Southwest Asian states to contain the Iran and Iraq governments. Pakistan currently is
considered the eastern flank of this strategy.4 Due to the constraints imposed on Pakistan by the
Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Pakistan's ability to be an active participant in
aU. S. strategy to 4efend interests in the Persian Gulf region is severely constrained.
Chapter IV considers thl~ historical debate concerning the Pressler Amendment and how the
rationale for arms transfers and sanctions has evolved since the legislation was written. Currently,
the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act stands as the greatest obstacle to improving
U.S. relations with Pakistan. The Pressler Amendment which bars U.S. foreign military sales and aid
to Pakistan has pitted the U.S. executive branch foreign policy objectives in South and Southwest
Asia against a congressional qm$t to halt nuclear proliferation. Since Pressler was invoked against
Pakistan in 1990, the executive branch has made three attempts to circumvent the strictures ofthe
Pressler Amendment which have contradicted U.S. national security strategy in the region. The
4 Prepared statement ofGen. J.R. Binford Peay III, USA, commander in chief, U.S.
Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 14, 1995. "Meeting the
Challenge in Central Command" Defense Issues, 10 no. 53. /defenselink/ internet via WWW.
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debate over the Pressler Amendment represents the difference in perception between the executive
branch and Congress concerning US. national security objectives in the region and ultimately the
context ofUS.-Pakistan relations to achieve those objectives.
Chapter V sets forth the specific constraints the Pressler Amendment imposes on Pakistani
participation and support for current US. regional security strategy and objectives. The precise
question to be answered will be, with the absolutes of the Pressler Amendment, can Pakistan be
integrated into the US. regional security strategy or could Pressler possibly drive Pakistan to counter
U.S. objectives? The chapter concludes with an analysis of, whether, in light of present U.S.
interests in the region, the Pressler Amendment should be repealed, amended or maintained to achieve
national security objectives in South and Southwest Asia.
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II. A COLD WAR WITHIN
The origin of Pakistan's national security strategy is found in tracing Pakistan's entry into
independence. Before Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, a basis of tension was created
between the Hindus and Muslims of greater India. This tension led to three wars between the post-
colonial states ofPakistan and India. Throughout the U.S.-Soviet cold war, the militarily inferior
Pakistan sought alignments with the United States, China and the Islamic states of Southwest Asia
to reach for military parity and gain political support to deter Indian aggression.
A. LEGACY OF PARTITION
The origins ofPakistan's national security strategy and the South Asian cold war can be traced
to the British colonial administrative strategy of"Divide and Rule." The British in the late nineteenth
century exploited separatist Muslim feelings to forestall a united Indian nationalist movement against
colonial rule in British India. The British rulers contended that the antipathies between Hindus and
Muslims made nationhood for the Indian people impossible.5 These feelings reinforced by the British,
resulted in demands for a separate Muslim electorate in 1906 as the British allowed the first
parliament bodies in India. With the passage ofthe Government ofIndia Act of 1935, elections were
held for newly created provincial legislatures. As the Muslim league won only 4.8 percent of the
Muslim vote, Muslim League leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah embarked on a new strategy against
Indian Congress domination stating that Islam was in danger and the congress was attempting to
divide Muslims in a bid to win Hindu domination throughout the country.6
5 Sumit Ganguly, The Origins ofWar in South Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 1.
6 Ganguly, The Origins ofWar, 18-24.
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Jinnah hardened his stand in 1942 demanding a separate state where Muslims could be fully
represented in a government based on the teachings ofIslam. This stand, that the Muslim minority
ofIndia constituted a nation in itself, was in direct contradiction to Nehru's vision ofa united secular
nation ofIndia.7
The ultimate partition of India in 1947 created both the Muslim theocracy in the state of
Pakistan and the secular India. Partition set the stage for both continued tension and a balance of
power relationship, measured in military capabilities, between the two countries which would define
regional security and insecurity in South Asia.
Tensions between the two countries arose out ofthe communal bloodbath which accompanied
partition. 8 Thousands of Muslims and Hindus were slaughtered as they crossed the new borders
seeking refuge in Pakistan and India respectively. Tensions were further escalated when the Hindu
leader ofthe predominately Muslim border state ofKashmir acceded to the Indian union in October
of 1947. A Muslim tribal revolt, supported by Pakistan, was controlled by the introduction ofIndian
regular forces into the region. As the two states moved closer to general war, the UN intervened
to draw a cease-fire line that divides the disputed region to the present.9
The disputed region of Kashmir represents the source of conflict and tension in the region.
For both India and Pakistan, the Kashmir region represents the legitimacy of each country's claim as
to the organizing principle of a nation, thus the legitimate status as a sovereign state in the world
7 Ganguly, The Origins ofWar, 23-24.
8 Lome 1. Kavic, India's Quest For Security: Defense Policies, 1947-1965 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1967), 31.
9 Kavic, India's Quest For Security, 32-36.
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system. India views the legitimacy ofa united secular India is founded on the inclusion ofthe Muslim
majority state ofKashmir. For Pakistan, the Muslim majority ofKashmir can only be represented in
a Muslim theocracy. Pakistan's national interest, which is first survival of the state's territorial
integrity, legitimizes Pakistan's claim as a nation ofMuslims separate from the greater India.
The military capabilities and thus the balance of power between India and Pakistan was
defined by the formula for division ofBritish India's assets at partition. The military assets ofBritish
India were proportioned 64:36 in India's favor to reflect the approximate communal balance between
the two countries. 10 With tensions between the two countries high as a result of partition and the
Kashmir conflict, Pakistan saw India's military superiority as a direct threat to their nation's survival
and immediately began to seek military and economic assistance from other countries.
B. PAKISTAN: A FRONTLINE STATE
As early as-October of 1947, the government ofPakistan sought a $2 billion dollar loan from
the United States to meet its perceived military and economic requirements. The Truman
administration turned down this request because, in the period 1947-1949, the United States had
neither the time nor resources for Pakistan in light of the Soviet threat to Europe.
With the first explosion ofa nuclear device by Russia and the loss ofChina to the communist
in 1949, US. interests towards South Asia were reappraised. With the United States looking closer
at the communist threat to greater Asia, Pakistan soon found a place in U.S. foreign policy objectives
by supporting US. involvement in the Korean War and the Japanese Peace Treaty. Pakistan's
political support of early US. security objectives in Asia combined with India's early appeasement
10 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press,
1984), 7.
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ofcommunist China led the United States to perceive Pakistan as a cooperative state in South Asia.
By the end ofthe Korean War Pakistan was seen as a staunch supporter of the westY
Truman's policy toward South Asia favored tilting to India, perceiving it as the largest
geopolitical prize, based on its size and population, in the early cold war calculus. Nehru's
uncompromising attitude toward non-alignment with either cold war superpower led Washington to
believe that India would not playa role in containment of communism in South Asia. 12 With India
out ofthe picture and Pakistan willing to align with the west, the United States developed a national
security strategy involving Pakistan to achieve the national security objective of containing
communism in South Asia.
Early U.S. containment objectives in South Asia were to deny the Soviets warm water ports
in the Indian Ocean and to deny Soviet expansion into the Middle East, which could disrupt the flow
of oil to the west. Thinking in these terms, the Eisenhower administration sought to organize a
regional grouping for defense ofthe Middle East. At the time Pakistan and Turkey were considered
to be "very strong bulwarks" to contain communism. The concept of "the northern tier states" was
thus enunciated. Pakistan because of its geostrategic location would serve as the vital link between
Southeast Asia and the Middle East in the U.S. strategy to contain communism. The U.S.
Department ofDefense saw Pakistan's strategic location as a possible launch area for long range
11 Rashmi Jain, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947-1983 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1983),3-5.
12 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 57-58.
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strategic bombing ofthe USSR. Others saw its location ideal for covert surveillance ofthe Soviets
and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture ofPersian Gulf oil fields. 13
In 1953, military and economic aid was granted to Pakistan. Fearing a stronger Pakistan,
India protested. When the United States considered the geostrategic importance ofa US.-Pakistan
alignment, Indian opposition to this new relationship did not appear as a costly liability to US.
foreign policy at this time. Pakistan confirmed its commitment to the west by signing the US.-
Pakistan Mutual Defense Agreement and became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and then signed the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which the United States
took an active part in 1958 under the label ofCENTO.14
While negotiating each mutual d.efense agreement, Pakistan sought assurances from the
United States for military aid in the event ofarmed aggression from India. The United States in each
case purposely avoided becoming embroiled in the Indo-Pak dispute by stipulating mutual defense
would only be guaranteed in the case of armed aggression from a communist controlled country.15
\\1tile Pakistan did not receive the assurance it sought from the United States, Pakistan reaped
the whirlwind with its newly acquired alliance with the United States. During the 1950's, economic
aid from the United States amounted to 40 percent of Pakistan's government outlays to foster
economic development. The 1950's saw 80 percent ofUS. foreign assistance to South Asia going
13 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 68.
14 Jain, US.- Pakistan Relations: 1947- 1983, 11-14.
15 Jain, US.-PakistanRelations: 1947- 1983, 13.
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directly to Pakistan. Extensive military aid, in the form of equipment and training, reduced Pakistan
worst fear ofanned aggression from India, as the military capabilities ofPakistan rose toward parity
with India. 16
The U.S.-Pakistan alliance throughout the 1950's served U.S. interests as a deterrent to
communist expansion in South and Southwest Asia while quenching Pakistan's thirst for security
against India. In 1959, this relationship was jeopardized by the spread of Soviet influence in India.
India had traditionally bought military.equipment :from western sources because of the large amount
of foreign aid India received from the west, especially :from the United States. John Kavic argued
that if India bought :from the Soviets the perception in the United States may cause a cutoff of
economic development funds from the United States. But in the period 1959-62, the Soviets offered
too lucrative a deal in the sale, licensing and payments toward Soviet aircraft up to and including the
fv!IG-21. Kavic further argued that India started to buy from the Soviets, looking for a symbolic
Soviet relationship in the face of increased tensions with India's northern neighbor China. 17
C. A CHANGING U.S. POLICY
Faced with an expanding Soviet sphere of influence in India, Washington was compelled to
tilt to the enemy of its IImost allied of allies. II When Kennedy came to office he had a history as a
senator for tilting to India. As the Eisenhower Administration saw Pakistan as the linchpin to U.S.
national security objectives in South Asia, Kennedy reverted to the philosophy that the geopolitical
prize in South Asia was India. In 1958, Kennedy working toward increased aid to India, wrote that
16 Jain, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947- 1983, 15.
17 Kavic, India's Quest for Security. 112-113.
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"ifIndia collapses, so may all ofAsia." Once in office, the Kennedy administration was ready to run
substantial risks with Pakistan to win the alignment ofIndia. 18
As the United States increased economic aid to India, Pakistan viewed the aid as indirect
military aid, as it enabled India to purchase weapons with American money. Pakistan felt that the
United States was giving more favorable treatment to a neutral country than one of its allies. As
disillusionment with the United States grew, Pakistan started to move counter to U.S. interests in
South Asia to diversifY their sources of military and economic aid in the face of a stronger India. In
1961, Pakistan signed an oil exploration agreement with Moscow and supported China's
representation in the UN. 19
In 1962, when tensions on the Sino-Indian border erupted into war, Pakistan requested that
the United States tie military aid to India contingent on the settlement of the Kashmir issue. The
Kennedy administration balked at this proposal, labeling it as blackmailing India during a national
crisis. Kennedy also did not want to upset India, as he saw this crisis as an opportunity to draw India
into an alignment with the west and worth the risk ofwidening the gap in U.S.-Pakistan relations. 20
Anwar H. Syed argues that Pakistan saw the Sino-Indian border dispute and resulting war as
being provoked by Nehru to receive greater military aid from the west as the Soviets and the United
States were both vying for greater influence in, if not alignment, from India. Further, the Pakistanis
saw the Soviet Union, once an ally of China, seeming to have an interest in containing China. While
Pakistan's overtures to China were resisted and chastised by the United States as counter to the
18 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 262-264.
19 Jain, U.S. Pakistan Relations: 1947-1983, 19-21.
20 Jain, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947-1983, 19-27.
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objectives ofSEATO and CENTO, Pakistani foreign policy was left with few options in the face of
greater military and economic support to India from both the United States and the Soviet Union.
A move counter to the U. S. alliance was now considered by the Pakistanis to be in the best interest
of Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India. Pakistan's foreign minister, Ali Bogra speaking before the
Pakistan national congress in November of 1962 summed up the new look in Pakistan foreign policy
which moved away from cold war ideology to survival instincts:
...As situations change, enemies can become friends and friends can become enemies. But
the most important and eternal fact is the question of national interest, national safety,
national integrity and national security, and that is ofparamount importance.21
After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, realizing that the settlement of the Kashmir issue was
critical to achieving balanced ties with both Pakistan and India, Washington sponsored Indo-Pakistan
talks to negotiate the issue. Just days before the talks were to commence Pakistan announced that
they and China concluded a provisional border demarcation agreement. Washington perceived the
Sino-Pak border agreement as Pakistan trying to seek common cause with the enemy ofIndia and
America. By April of 1963 the Kashmir talks had bogged down and Kennedy realizing that the
chances for a settlement were nil committed military aid to India to guard against another Chinese
attack.22
When Lyndon Johnson took office in late 1963, Pakistan foreign minister Bhutto announced
that Pakistan would host a state visit from Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. Johnson was deeply
disturbed by Pakistan's willingness to forge closer ties with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC),
21 Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: A Entente Cordiale (Massachusetts: University
of Massachusetts Press, 1974), 97-107.
22 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 301-304
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who he felt were supporters of the communist insurgency in Vietnam. Bhutto defended Pakistan's
move toward Beijing which he stated was not based on ideology, but rather the threat which a U.S.
commitment to bolster the military capabilities ofIndia brought against Pakistan. Johnson's advisors
did not buy this position, but rather emphasized that Pakistan relations with the PRC were
contradictory to Pakistan's obligations to the SEATO and CENTO alliances.23
Johnson having a long tenure in Congress knew that continued increases in foreign aid to the
sub-continent would soon be contested in Congress. While his advisors recommended a long term
military and economic aid program for India, Johnson would only commit to a one year agreement.
Washington also hoped the short term commitment may placate the strained U.S.-Pakistan relations.
With the announcement of the U.S.-Indo aid agreement, widespread anti-western protests swept
Pakistan, as the Pakistani leadership announced that they would now have to reappraise its
commitments to SEATO and CENTO.24 Upset with the demands that both India and Pakistan were
putting on the United States, Johnson cancelled previously scheduled state visits from both countries.
D. 1965 WAR AND PAKISTAN'S TILT TO CHINA
As Johnson cancelled the state visits, India and Pakistan became engaged in border clashes
in the Rann ofKutch. These skirmishes ultimately led to a war in the disputed region ofKashmir.25
Frustrated with the actions ofboth countries, Washington prohibited the use of American weapons
by both sides during the crisis. In this situation, Johnson could not reconcile support for a UN
sponsored cease-fire while supplying weapons to both sides. This ultimately hit Pakistan hardest as
23 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 306-308.
24 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 320-323.
25 Ganguly, Origins of War, 47-49.
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nearly all their military equipment was supplied by the United States. India on the other hand had a
large amount of Soviet weapons with which to carry out the war. 26
In the wake of the war Johnson cut off all aid to both countries. He felt it was time to
reevaluate what exactly U.S. interests were in South Asia. Johnson was now ready to take a low
profile with both India and Pakistan as he saw the war between India and Pakistan as an
embarrassment to American foreign policy. Johnson's eagerness to disengage from the region, was
most evident in his support for Soviet led negotiations between Pakistan and India after a UN cease-
fire was secured?7
At the end ofthe 1965 Kashmir war anti-American sentiments were running high in Pakistan.
The U.S. effort to arm India in conjunction with their failure to adequately intermediate the Kashmir
talks combined with an arms embargo at the end of the 1965 war, allIed Pakistanis to feel that the
United States had greatly neglected its ally, Pakistan.28
Seeking out communist China provided appreciable dividends for Pakistan in light of the
superpowers pursuit of Indian alignment. Aligning with the enemy of its enemy, Pakistan was able
to influence the regional balance of power as Soviet and American aid were leading to an ever more
powerful India. The Chinese were able to diplomatically link the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak conflict
together not allowing the Soviet Union to openly side with India, which fostered a sense ofurgency
between the United States and the Soviets to terminate the war. Chinese influence brought about a
cease-fire on terms acceptable to Pakistan. This made a deep and lasting impression on Pakistani
26 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 325-328.
27 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 334-335.
28 Sharin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 23-24.
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public opinion, making it increasingly pro-Chinese.29 In the period from 1965 -1971, China fulfilled
Pakistan's quest for military supplies and political support against its adversary India. By offering
political support to the Chinese against India and acting as a regional balancer to a perceived Soviet
expansion in Asia, Pakistan found a favorable place in China's security strategy from which Pakistan
was rewarded. The U.S. arms embargo as a result of the 65' war was finally modified to allow the
sale of spare parts to Pakistan in 1967. With western and Soviet sentiment tilting to India, western
arms producers and the Soviets were hesitant to sell arms to Pakistan in fear of alienating India.30
During this time the Chinese became a major arms supplier to Pakistan supplying nearly 200 combat
aircraft, 400 tanks, surface to air missiles and countless small weapons. The terms on which these
supplies were granted is still not clear, but by 1972 the Chinese had converted all previous loans to
Pakistan into grants.3 !
E. 1971 WAR AND UNRELIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES
In 1969, despite the arms embargo by the United States, the new leader ofPakistan, General
Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan saw a chance to once again become an integral part ofU.S. national
security interests in Asia. In a visit to Pakistan that year, President Nixon asked Yahya to act as a
conduit between the United States and China in an effort to normalize relations between the United
29 Seyid, China and Pakistan, 109.·
30 Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 24.
3! Seyid, China and Pakistan, 140.
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States and China. Yahya agreed to handle this in the utmost secrecy and Nixon assured Yahya of his
goodwill and a place for Pakistan in Nixon's emerging strategy.32
While the origins and events leading up to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and the emergence
ofthe independent state ofBangladesh out ofwhat was once East Pakistan are well documented, as
are the Nixon White House perceptions and actions including the dispatch of the aircraft carrier
Enterprise battle group to the Bay of Bengal, to prevent India from destroying West Pakistan as
general war broke out,33 several Pakistani perceptions in the aftermath of the war need to be
emphasized. The dispatch by Nixon of Task Force 74 to the Bay of Bengal was seen by Pakistan
and China as an unequivocal signal to India not to invade West Pakistan. While Nixon clearly was
dependant on Yahya and sincere in his rapprochement with China, he was severely constrained
domestically to provide military support in Pakistan's hour of need, due to an arms embargo he could
not lift. While Nixon and Kissinger were able to use third countries to filter weapons to Pakistan, this
support was seen as totally inadequate in view ofthe huge transfer ofweapons to India by the Soviets
throughout 1971, including a massive airlift ofmilitary supplies when the war broke out. Tahir-Kheli
explains that a country's support and friendship is weighed by Pakistan in terms of concrete military
assistance and in this case the United States fell well short of a reliable ally.34
32 Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 31.
33 For a chronology of events of the 1971 Indo-Pak crisis and war see Ganguly, Origins
of War, 97-137. To understand the perceptions and actions of the Nixon White House
throughout this crisis refer to Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs ofRichard Nixon (New York:
Grossett and Dunlap, 1978) and Henry A Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1979).
34 Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 48-49.
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After the 1971 war, with the loss of East Pakistan, Pakistanis new prime minister Z.A.
Bhuttols first concern was for security and survival of the state of Pakistan which could only be
accomplished through greater defense. With the loss of $200 million in military equipment due to
the 1971 war, Pakistan sought the open market to purchase arms, spending $115 million or 20
percent of the country's export earnings in 1972. The economic strain of these purchases forced
Bhutto to request that the United States lift the arms embargo and resume military aid to Pakistan.
At this time, Washington viewed Pakistan's open purchases and $65 million worth ofarms given by
the Chinese as adequate to care for Pakistan's security needs not requiring a lifting of the arms
embargo.35 This period ofPakistan foreign policy saw Pakistan, in the face of a U.S. arms embargo,
to look to the Islamic countries of Southwest Asia for economic and political support to coerce the
west to once again recognize the security needs ofPakistan.
F. TILT TO THE MIDDLE EAST
Faced with a perceived deficit in security and political support, Bhutto turned to the Islamic
states of Southwest Asia for support. Z.A. Bhutto successfully linked the Indo-Pakistan struggle as
a threat not only to Pakistan but to all Islamic states. While the Shah of Iran led OPEC to raising
oil prices in 1973, Bhutto claimed that a united third world led by the wealth of the OPEC nations
could challenge the superpowers who have previously bled the third world.36 Bhutto's recognition
ofthe vulnerability ofthe west's reliance on Middle East oil and his ability to mobilize a pan Islamic
movement in Southwest Asia would pay high dividends in his quest for security from India.
35 T'ahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 57-58.
36 Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 63-64.
21
Under Bhutto's leadership, Pakistan first received economic and military aid from the Shah
who linked Pakistan's security to the territorial integrity ofIran. Financial support also came from
Saudi Arabia, Lybia and Abu Dhabi to purchase arms from both the French and Chinese. In return
Lybia and Abu Dhabi received contract military personnel from Pakistan, which provided these
countries military expertise in the operation and maintenance ofboth western and eastern modem
weapon systems. It is strongly believed that pressure from both the Shah and the Saudis caused
Washington to reassess the geostrategic importance ofPakistan in Southwest Asia leading to a lifting
of the U.S. Arms embargo in 1975.37
G. THE ISLAMIC BOMB
The successful detonation ofa nuclear device by India in 1974, significantly altered Pakistan's
strategy for insuring security against India. Bhutto looked to the United States and other western
nuclear nations to provide a nuclear umbrella to safeguard Pakistan against the Indian threat. The
United States and other western nuclear powers, as a reaction to the Indian test, saw a clear danger
that unstable countries may acquire a nuclear capability that would pose a serious danger to peace
and stability in the world. It was within this context, that the United States, Britain and France saw
Pakistan with its advanced technology and infrastructure as the missing link to proliferation of nuclear
weapons to both OPEC and third world countries. By denying Pakistan a nuclear umbrella, the
western powers were able to physically stay out ofthe Indo-Pak dispute in South Asia that did not
affect their national interests, while also trying to halt nuclear proliferation throughout the world.
From the Pakistani perspective, a nuclear deterrent was the only way to protect their state from
nuclear blackmail by India to gain political concessions. Pakistan also felt that a nuclear option
37 Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 88-89.
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would also end the vicious cycle of dependence on external sources of arms supplies, which had
driven Pakistani foreign policy since partition. With the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 fresh in the
mind of Pakistan and the perception ofthe unreliability of the United States and China to intervene
militarily for Pakistan in response to Indian aggression, Z.A. Bhutto gave the green light to start
Pakistanis nuclear weapons program.38
Pakistan's quest for a nuclear deterrent would greatly affect its ability to receive military aid
from the west, especially the United States. With reports that Pakistan had acquired an
unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility, the Carter administration invoked an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act which suspended aid to Pakistan in April of 1979.39
H. FROM FRONTLINE TO FALLOUT
With the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan in December of 1979, the geostrategic importance
of Pakistan was once again reassessed by the United States. With a Soviet threat to South and
Southwest Asia, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, leader of Pakistan's new martial law regime found
a position in U.S. foreign policy strategy in South Asia to modernize his military with U.S. aid. The
Soviet threat to Central and South Asia resulted in the Reagan administration in 1981 to announce
an agreement on a six-year, $3.2 billion military aid package to Pakistan. With the resumption of
military aid, Pakistan once again became a frontline state against Soviet aggression as Pakistan was
able to provide a channel for U.S. anus to the Mujahideen rebels ofMghanistan. Greater military aid
to Pakistan including F-16s was also to underscore the United States interests in the security of
38 Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, 119-121.
39 Richard P. Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff: U.S. Non Proliferation and Foreign Policy
Considerations (Congressional Research Service, Library ofCongress, 25 March 1994), Order
Code IB90149, 15.
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Pakistan. Even with greater aid from the United States, throughout the 1980's a major portion of
Pakistani military purchases continued to be financed through aid from Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates and other Southwest Asia oil-producing countries.40
U.S. aid in the 1980's was highly scrutinized by the U.S. Congress who still sought to deter
the proliferation ofnuclear weapons. In 1981, Congress granted the President the authority to waive
the nuclear provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in Pakistan's case until 1987, if the
President deemed it necessary in pursuit of the national interest. While the President had the
authority to waive the nuclear provisions ofthe FAA, Congress produced two significant amendments
to the FAA that would single out the Pakistani program in the years to come.
The Solarz amendment sought to cut offaid to any country who attempted to export nuclear
weapons technology from the United States. The Pressler Amendment to the FAA stipulated that
the President was required to certify annually that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device in order
to receive military aid. President Reagan first invoked the national security waiver in 1987 as a
Pakistan national was convicted of trying to export materials from the United States that could be
used in making centrifuges for enriching uranium. After 1987, without the ability to waive the
pertinent provisions of the FAA the President could only certify that Pakistan did not possess a
nuclear device which both President Reagan and Bush said had become increasingly difficult after
40 Rodney W. Jones, "The Military and Security in Pakistan," in Craig Baxter, ed. Zia's
Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 82-83.
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1987. In 1990, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Bush did not certify Pakistan
as not possessing a nuclear device invoking the Pressler Amendment which made Pakistan ineligible
for U.S. assistance. 41
I. CONCLUSIONS
Tensions that arose as a result of the partition of India to create a Muslim theocracy in the
state of Pakistan and the first Kashmir war created a South Asian cold war. Balance of power,
measured in military capabilities, that favored India, threatened the territorial integrity and thus the
survival of the state ofPakistan. To reach military parity with India, Pakistan sought a place in the
security interests ofgreat powers and regional neighbors to receive military and economic aid to deter
Indian aggression. In the emerging U.~.- Soviet cold war of the 1950's, Pakistan found that by
politically supporting the United States and being a willing member to cooperative defense against
communist aggression, they would receive massive amounts of military and economic aid.
When an ideologically based alignment with the United States was undermined by greater
U.S. assistance to India, Pakistan turned to the enemy ofits enemy, perceiving a Sino-Soviet split,
where Pakistan could act as a regional balancer to Chinese fears of Soviet expansion in Asia. The
military aid and the symbolic alignment with the·Chinese would serve as a strong deterrent to Indian
aggression as U.S. interests in South Asia became clouded due to the persistent Indo-Pak tensions
and the 1965 Kashmir war.
In the early 1970's, Pakistan saw the west vulnerable to oil supplies and pricing from the
Southwest Asia oil-producing nations. Espousing the commonality of Islam and a united third world,
Pakistan sought to lead Southwest Asia regional interests against both the west and India. In the
41 Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff, 14-15.
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Middle East, Pakistan found its comparative advantage as a modern military power amongst the
Islamic states. Pakistan's ability to provide military training personnel and technical experts to the
Middle East armies was welcomed by the OPEC nations. In return, Pakistan was rewarded with
loans and grants to acquire arms on the open market to guard against western arms embargoes.
Finally, Pakistan proved most adept at playing the u.s. containment policy when the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan. In spite of harsh criticism from the United States on both human rights and
nuclear non-proliferation, they found billions ofdollars in U. S. military aid while serving once again
as a front-line state against communism.
Pakistan throughout the u.S.-Soviet cold war played a pragmatic game ofsurvival from a
threat of aggression from India. The Pakistani leadership was adept at switching from ideologically
based alignments, to acting as a regional balancer, to portraying itself as a modem Islamic state with
a powerful military to gain military aid and political support against its historical rival India.
Due to the large amount ofboth economic and military aid received from the United States,
the U.S.-Pakistani relationship deserves special attention. The U.S.-Soviet cold war relationship
between the United States and Pakistan was most effective for both countries when U.S. foreign
policy was based on attainment ofgeostrategic objectives. During periods when U. S. foreign policy
favored geopolitical objectives such as nuclear nonproliferation or attempting to win alignment or
recognizing the preeminence of India, Pakistan would act counter to U.S. interests.
The Truman administration saw the geopolitical prize in South Asia as winning alignment of
the democratic India. India's non-alignment policy frustrated the United States who were developing
a cold war strategy ofcontainment. With India as an unwilling participant, geographically containing
communism was left to Pakistan who would serve as the link between cooperative defense ofthe
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Middle East and Southeast Asia. When the Kennedy administration tried to once again win alignment
with India, because of India's size and democratic government, the United States was willing to
sacrifice the east-west link in Asian cooperative defense. While the United States was unable to wean
India away from Soviet influence, Pakistan denounced its ideological commitment to US. objectives
in Asia by moving toward communist China to counter a stronger India, which both the Soviets and
the U.S. threw economic and military aid at to win Indian alignment in the cold war battle for
influence.
When Pakistan did try to serve U.S. geopolitical goals by being a secret channel for the United
States to seek a rapprochement with China the results, which Pakistan was sure to measure in
concrete military aid, were disastrous. Pakistan received nothing for providing an uncompromising
secret channel to Beijing for the United States. As Yahya Khan did everything that the Nixon White
House had asked, Pakistan saw the U.S. President as severely constrained by Congress who invoked
an arms embargo against Pakistan, as a response to the repressive crackdown by the West Pakistan
military attempting to quash a separatist movement in East Pakistan in March of 1971. While the
separatist movement in East Pakistan was supported by India, the US. Congress saw West Pakistan's
military regime bent toward genocide as a tBol to build stability. Throughout 1971, the US.
Congress did not understand Nixon's tilt to Pakistan as the secret channel to China was operational
from March through July, then made public and ultimately preserved by a display of credibility to
China as the Indo-Pak war ignited and the Enterprise Battlegroup was sent to the Bay ofBengal.
Throughout this time, the U.S. Congress felt that the geopolitical imperative in South Asia was to
support the democratic India as opposed to assisting brutal military dictatorships that the West
Pakistan leadership represented.
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In the 1970's, the geopolitical imperatives of human rights and preventing global nuclear
proliferation drove Pakistan to find common ground in Islam with the OPEC nations of Southwest
Asia who were able to strangle the western economies. It was only when the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan which presented a communist encroachment into the Middle East and South Asia were
U.S. geopolitical goals in the region set aside to push the Soviet military out of Southwest Asia.
When General Zia was threatened by the Soviets, U.S. military aid once again reach Pakistan to
preserve the territorial integrity ofPakistan. General Zia used the aid to modernize the Pakistan army
in order to deter Indian aggression from his east flank. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,
U.S. geopolitical goals have once again resurfaced forcing the U.S. to retreat from military aid to
their "most allied of allies. "
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III. PAKISTAN'S POST COLD WAR QUEST FOR SECURITY
With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the u.S.-Soviet cold war,
Pakistan faces new challenges in their quest for security from Indian aggression. In the post U.S.-
Soviet cold war era, the geostrategic significance ofPakistan to both the United States and China
has decreased. In the United States and China, Pakistan can no longer be considered as a bulwark
or balancer against Soviet expansion in Asia. Without the historical rationale for inclusion in China's
or the U.S. security strategy, Pakistan is scrambling to find economic and military assistance as the
South Asian cold war has continued unabated.
In the post cold war era, South Asia has emerged as a regional flashpoint due to continued
tensions between Pakistan and India. Tensions over Kashmir in both 1987 and 1990, caused
Washington to believe that a future Kashmir war might involve the use of nuclear weapons. 42 With
tensions between the two countries high, the military balance of power on the subcontinent will favor
India for the foreseeable future. Currently India maintains the world's fourth largest military, has
ambitious plans for a blue-water navy, a growing missile (ICBM) capability, and is nearing self-
sufficiency in conventional weapons.43 As the Indian threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan
continues, Pakistan is presently attempting to revive and deepen historical ties with the United States
and China, while trying to expand an economic and political alignment of the Muslim states from
Southwest Asia to include the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CAR).
42 Nalini Kant Jha, "Reviving U.S.-India Friendship in a Changing International Order,"
Asian Survey 34, no 12 (December 1994): 1035
43 Iftikhar H. Malik, "Pakistan's National Security and Regional Issues," Asian Survey
34, no. 12 (December 1994): 1086.
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A. REVIVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
First, Pakistan is currently seeking better relations with the United States in the face of
improved U.S.-Indo relations as a result ofa shift in U.S. policy originating in the 1980's. S.D. Muni
cites an emerging policy in the Carter administration, to recognize "regional influentials" ofthe third
world, shifted U.S. policy in South Asia to more fully recognize the preeminence ofIndia in world
affairs. In the late 1970's, India espoused itself as a country committed to democracy and non-
military use of nuclear weapons naturally drawing the Carter administration to seek improved
relations with India. Despite the US. tilt to Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979, the United States throughout the 1980s began to recognize that India was
becoming stronger economically and held a promise of offering a sizable market for US. goods,
services and investments. With the possibility that an Indian market could be critical to US.
economic development, the United States in the 1980s developed a three pronged strategy to
cultivate good relations with India.
Concerning security issues, in 1984 the United States and India concluded an agreement on
the transfer of dual use (civilian and defense) technology between the two countries. Transfers of
technology were augmented by military to military contacts at high levels between both countries.
Technology transfers have also given rise to greater economic cooperation between the United States
and India, as the United States has become India's largest trading partner. In the 1980's, the United
States has refrained from criticizing India's approach to relations with its neighbors. The Pakistanis
are concerned over the United States shift in policy regarding Kashmir. Historically, the United
States has supported the UN mandated plebiscite to resolve the dispute which the Pakistanis have
always supported. In the 1980's US. policy shifted toward bilateral negotiations between the
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Pakistan and India which India favors as a method to resolution of the dispute. This combined with
the U.S. condemnation ofPakistani support for Kashmiri militants has left the Pakistani's with little
political support from the west in the post cold war era as India's economic and political strength
increases. 44 Also, Pakistan is currently seeking better relations with the United States to reverse
the devastating impact of the Pressler Amendment on the material readiness of their conventional
forces. U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives in South Asia have thwarted Pakistan's ability to
receive military and economic assistance from the United States. In light of the Pressler Amendment,
Pakistan is trying to shift U.S. and international pressure to India. Pakistan over the years has
presented a number of proposals to reach a regional solution for nuclear nonproliferation. Pakistan
has previously proposed declaring South Asia a nuclear free zone. A recent Pakistani proposal is
for a five nation initiative on the matter involving the United States, Russia, China, India and
Pakistan, which was welcomed and supported by the United States.45 To date, India has refused
to participate in either regional or extra-regional dialogue concerning nuclear non-proliferation based
on their historical perspective ofNPT. From India's standpoint, the NPT divides the world into haves
and have nots and is discriminatory in nature to developing countries. India feels that nuclear
disarmament requires a global approach, that would require all states equal compliance in a
worldwide nuclear regime.46 Despite Pakistani domestic support (measured as high as 87 percent
44 S.D. Muni, "The United States and South Asia: The Strategic Dimension," in Shelton
U. Kodikara, ed, External Compulsions of South Asia Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
1993), 70-75.
45 Iftikhar H. Malik, "Pakistan's National Security and Regional Issues," 34, no. 12:
1087-88.
46 The Asia Society, Preventing Nuclear Proliferation In South Asia ( New York: Asia
Society, 1995), 7.
31
in favor47) for a nuclear weapon capability, the Pakistani government has continued to state that
Pakistan would not export nuclear technology or any nuclear product relative to military use, adding
further that Pakistan would sign the NPT ifIndia also agrees to. 48
While trying to shift U. S. and international pressure away from Pakistan's nuclear program,
Pakistan is currently trying to once again find a place in current U.S. national security strategy.
Without a regional communist threat, Pakistan is espousing itself once again as a geostrategic and
geopolitical critical state in u.s. foreign policy. On a recent visit to the United States, during a press
conference with President Clinton, Benazir Bhutto emphasized that "Pakistan as a moderate,
democratic, Islamic country of 130 million can playa positive role for U.S. interests in a politically
volatile region. " She also emphasized that the strategic location ofPakistan at the tri-junction of
South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf, intimately ties U.S. regional interests and objectives to the
future ofPakistan. Pakistan is further emphasizing its current convergence of interests with the U. S.
by participating in UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti, extradition of drug traffickers
and a terrorist suspect in the World Trade Center bombing and as a country who has taken positive
steps to eradicate poppy cultivation and heroin laboratories in Pakistan.49
B. DEEPENING RELAnONS WITH CHINA
In the post cold war era, Pakistan relations with China are perhaps taking on a new dimension.
Historically Pakistan has described relations with China as "loftier than the Himalayas and deeper than
47 Rais A. Khan, "Pakistan in 1991", Asian Survey 32 no. 2 (February 1992) 205.
48 Rais A. Khan, "Pakistan in 1992," Asian Survey 33 no. 2 (February 1993) 139.
49 Clinton: Pakistan, India Should Eliminate Nuclear Weapons. (Transcript: Clinton-
Bhutto joint news conference, 12 April 1995)
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the Indian Ocean." Without a Soviet threat in Asia, China appears to be more cautious in taking
sides in Indo-Pakistan disputes, although China opposes a hegemonic threat that India presents in
South Asia. 50 While this anti-hegemonic stance is consistent with China's regional and international
policies, China is beginning to forge new relations with India.
The Pakistanis are particularly concerned over the warming of Sino-Indian relations whose
roots are found in changes in Chinese foreign policy in the 1980's. Mahinda Werake cites a Chinese
foreign policy shift in the 1980's from forming a "united front" against Soviet expansion to identifying
more closely with the third world. Perceiving a decline in both Soviet and U.S. power throughout
the decade, Werbake argues China predicted the emergence ofa multi-polar world where the role of
the third world would be enhanced. China's independent foreign policy paralleled a shift led by the
pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping to link foreign policy with China's economic development.
Improving relations with India would provide China the requisite link to a traditional third world
leader and provide new opportunities for economic growth based on the size and potential of the
Indian market. 51
The shift in Chinese policy is most evident and of particular concern to Pakistan in the Joint
Working Group (JWG) between China and India working to demarcate the Sino-Indian border.
The JWG has enjoyed success in instituting confidence building measures between the two armies
stationed along the border as both sides are working toward a "fair, reasonable and mutually
acceptable" agreement on how and where to define the border. Sino-Indian relations have also
50 Khan; "Pakistan in 1992," 139.
51 Mahinda Werake, "China and South Asia in the Eighties," in Shelton U. Kodikara, ed,
External Compulsions of South Asia Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 79-84.
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resulted in protocols to open border trade routes in 1991, 1992 and 1993.52 Even more alarming to
Pakistan is that China has refrained from supporting Pakistan on the Kashmir Issue since 1990. China
like the United States is now calling for bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan to resolve
the dispute peacefully. Concerning Kashmir, China is worried about Islamic militants fomenting
violence and instability in a region so close to the Xinjiang province. With the possible threat of
Islamic separatist movements spreading into China's western provinces, China is opposed to the
creation of an independent Jammu and Kashmir at this time. 53
To offset Indian moves toward China, Benazir Bhutto in 1993 asked China to playa
mediating role to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In return, Pakistan promised China political support
to ward off international pressure against China by the United States.54 While this request in 1993
was politely turned down by China, in 1995 China has agreed to mediate between Pakistan and India
to resolve the dispute. 55 While the Sino-Pakistan alliance appears idealistically strong based on both
countries historical relations, Chinese movements toward India point to less political support for
Pakistan as China pragmatically seeks economic growth through a new regional relationship with the
larger India.
52 Sutjit Mansingh, "India-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," Asian Survey 34
no. 3 (March 1994), 290-292.
53 Mansingh, "India-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," 298.
54 Tahir Amin, "Pakistan in 1993," Asian Survey 34 no. 2 (February 1994): 199.
55 AlIi Abbas Rizvi, "China Supports Pakistan Stance On Kashmir," Asian Defence
Journal (February, 1995): 92.
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C. LOOKING TO SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL ASIA
The demise of the Soviet Union with the creation of the newly independent Central Asian
Republics (CAR) has forged Pakistan new opportunities in a region that was previously hostile to
Pakistan. Pakistan looks on the newly emerging Central Asian Muslim states as a future arena of
diplomatic and economic initiatives. Pakistan visualizes a new economic region in the making
comprising Pakistan., Iran., Turkey, and the CAR.56 Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as founding members
ofthe Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) quickly invited the CAR to join the organization
accenting the essential geopolitical and cultural commonalities that the CAR can bring to the ECO.
Together these countries have 300 million people and could become the largest economic block after
the EEC. Plans for joint ventures in rail and road links, telecommunications networks, gas and oil
pipelines, electricity grids and cross border facilities for movement of goods and people are being
undertaken. Pakistan can offer the CAR the shortest outlet to the sea, and the CAR can provide
Pakistan a large export market for Pakistani goods and services. As Pakistan has always looked to
an Indian dominated South Asia, the CAR has provided a new opportunities to balance the regional
power ofIndia. 57
Besides Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, India is also vying for influence in Central Asia in an
attempt to prevent Pakistan from becoming a dominant player in the region. Due to India's historical
close relations with Moscow, India has traditional ties to the former Soviet republics. India feels they
56 Khan, "Pakistan in 1992," 137.
57 Iftikar H. Malik, "Pakistan's National Security and Regional Issues" Asian Survey 34
no.2 (December 1994): 1089.
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have a good chance now to participate in the economic development of Central Asia. India has
signed agreements to promote trade, scientific and technical cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kirghizia
and Turkmenistan. 58
Looking to the Islamic states of Southwest and Central Asia, Benazir Bhutto echoing Iranian
statements has proposed an Islamic bloc for collective security. Speaking at the seventh summit of
the Organization ofIslamic Conference (OIC) she stated:
As a first step, let us commit ourselves never to use force against each other. Let an
aggression against an Islamic country be considered an aggression against all Muslim
countries. Let us agree that the victim of such aggression will receive every
assistance from the Islamic countries. 59
Benazir Bhutto also emphasized the economic opportunities of a unified Islamic world.
Underlying the need for greater mutual trade, Bhutto emphasized that the Islamic world collectively
has sizeable financial assets, large markets, low waged and adequate technical expertise to effectively
increase economic activity and national prosperity for all Islamic countries.
Pakistan's recent foreign policy moves display a country whose threat has not changed but
historical alignments and alliances have been undermined by the demise of the Soviet Union. Now,
both the United States and China look to improve relations with India based on the size and economic
potential ofthe Indian market. With few options left to receive military and political support against
5X Amal Jayawardena, "Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy Since Gorbachev," in Shelton
U. Kodikara, ed, External Compulsions of South Asia Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
1993),117-118.
59 Ali Abbas Rizvi, "Benazir Proposes Islamic Block For Collective Security" Asian
Defence (February 1995): 88-90.
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India, Pakistan is once again trying to create apan-Islamic movement in Southwest and Central Asia




IV. PRESENT U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY IN THE
REGION
u.s. security objectives and strategy in the Middle East and South Asia have evolved with
the end of the U.S.-Soviet cold war. U.S. security objectives in the region have changed from
containing communist encroachment into the Middle East and South Asia to containing Iran-Iraq and
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. The United States
published "National Security Policy ofEngagement and Enlargement" presents an overview of the
challenges to U.S. foreign policy in the region.
A. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT
In the Middle East, U.S. security objectives are presently to insure the security ofIsrael, the
United States' Arab friends and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. In Southwest
Asia, the United States is committed to deter threats to regional stability particularly from the states
ofIran and Iraq. The United States has a dual containment policy aimed at these two states and will
continue to provide a naval presence and prepositioned combat equipment in the region to deter both
these states from threatening U.S. vital interests in the gulf U.S. policy toward Iran is aimed at
changing the behavior of the Iranian government in several areas including, obtaining weapons of
mass destruction and missiles, its support for terrorism and its attempts to undermine friendly
governments in the region. A major objective in the Gulf is to reduce the chances another aggressor
will emerge who would threaten the independence of an existing state. The United States is
committed to work closely with the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC) on collective security
arrangements, help GCC states meet military requirements and maintain U.S. bilateral defense
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agreements. Recognizing the expansion of democracy and economic reform in South Asia, the
United States hopes to help the people of the region enjoy the fiuits of democracy and greater
stability through efforts to resolve long standing conflicts and implementing confidence building
measures between India, Pakistan and China. The United States has engaged both India and Pakistan
to cap, reduce and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capabilities. The
United States believes that greater regional stability and improved bilateral ties will be important for
America's growing economic interest in the region. 60
US. Secretary ofDefense William Perry speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations
in May of 1995, articulated the framework and reasons for the US. strategy to contain Iran and Iraq.
The framework of US. strategy is based on three components which are bolstering the defense
capability ofour allies, maintaining a forward presence in the region and forging access agreements
with allies. This strategy requires the United States to bolster bilateral defense working relationships
with each ofthese countries to consider arms purchases and plan joint military training and exercises.
The second part of the strategy is to improve the collective defense capabilities ofthe gulfnations
through the GCC. Third, the United States seeks access agreements for staging pre-positioned
equipment to "ratchet" up US. forces quickly in the region should hostilities break out that threaten
US. interests.
The U. S. dual containment policy is designed to contain, limit and isolate the aggressive,
violent behavior ofboth Iran and Iraq for the following reasons. The United States considers both
countries as hostile to their gulfneighbors and to Israel, countries allied with the United states. Both




B. CENTCOM CONTAINMENT STRATEGY
While forward presence is most clearly identifiable inpower projection from the United States.
goals currently are to establish a second brigade set with a division base in Southwest Asia. Once a
Currently the United States has a brigade set of equipment pre-positioned in Kuwait. CENTCOM
in the region to quickly link personnel to equipment is a tactical imperative for CENTCOM.
continued U.S. naval presence in the region, gaining access for prepositioning ofcombat equipment
In testimony before the US. Senate Armed Services Committee Gen Binford Peay,
second brigade set is established, CENTCOM hopes to position a third set in the region which will
supported by five pillars. They include forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance and
required "carefully cultivated regional ties." Gen Peay emphasized that the theater strategy was
Egypt and East Afiica through the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan, Peay emphasized that this strategy
61 Prepared remarks ofUS. Secretary ofDefense William Perry, "Working with Gulf
Allies to Contain Iraq and Iran" Defense Issues 10 no. 61, (May 18,1995).
commander in chief, US. Central Command (CENTCOM) outlined specific objectives to be attained
in order to contain Iraq and Iran. Noting that the CENTCOM area ofresponsibility extends from
weapons. Adding to the problem has been Iran's acquisition of submarines with mine-laying
capabilities and patrol boats with anti-ship missiles. 61
several thousand troops to these islands equipped with artillery, anti-ship missiles and chemical
particularly concerned about Iran's military build-up on several small gulf islands in the Straits of
Hormuz, through which 90 percent of the gulf oil exports travel through. Recently Iran has added
threats. While Iraq's record concerning aggression is well documented, the United States is
Iran and Iraq are considered by the US. to bea.lIlong the worlds most dangerous nuclear proliferation
allow for a heavy division's worth of equipment, adding flexibility, the requisite firepower and
command and control to increase US. military capabilities in the early phases ofa military operation.
Through a continued naval presence and increased pre-positioning ofcombat equipment throughout
the region, CENTCOM hopes to enhance US. war fighting capabilities and show American resolve
to protect their interests in the region.
Another pillar is to provide security assistance to regional friends. This pillar involves
improving the defense capabilities of regional friends, training regional militaries, promoting
interoperability, strengthening military to military relationships and increasing overtime the ability of
"
states to provide for individual and collective defense. Essential to achieve these objectives is foreign
military sales, foreign military financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and
mobile training and technical assistance field teams. CENTCOM feels these activities not only
support regional defensive arrangements, but also provide a degree of U.S. control over arms
transfers to the region. Presence, forward pre-positioning of equipment and improving the defense
capabilities ofregional friends are all critical to the U.S. national security objective of containing Iraq
and Iran. 62
C. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
U.S. interest in nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia stems from the region already being
a flashpoint for conflict, the demands a nuclear exchange would put on the United States and the
threat with which a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India would create to U.S. interests
worldwide. In testimony to US. Senate Armed Services Committee in March of 1995, assistant
62 Prepared statement of Gen. lH. Binford Peay III, USA, commander in chief, U.S.
Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 14, 1995. "Meeting the
Challenge in Central Command" Defense Issues, 10 no. 53. /defenselink/ internet via WWW.
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defense secretary Joseph Nye reinforced that the history of bitter animosity between the two
countries, including three wars and a common border which both sides have the majority of their
troops deployed, make the border, especially in the Kashmir region a potential flashpoint that could
result in a nuclear exchange. The DOD first is very concerned with the immediate demands a nuclear
exchange would put upon the United States military. DOD envisions requests for disaster re1iefup
to and including assistance with decontamination would be overwhelming. Second the DOD is
concerned that the use ofnuclear weapons by India or Pakistan might affect the calculations of states
in other regions that might use nuclear weapons against U.S. interests. As the DOD is charged with
protecting U. S. interests worldwide it is very much in the interest of the United States military to
"cap, reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. ,,63
The United States has chosen a strategy to first attempt to reduce tensions to avoid conflicts
between the two countries and inhibit nuclear weapon technology exports to India and Pakistan. The
United States seeks to create a climate in which India and Pakistan's sense of security is increased
through the application of confidence building measures. U.S. goals are to have both countries
recognize the inherent costs and risks inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons. By inhibiting
exports of nuclear weapon and missile technology to India and Pakistan the United States hopes to
discourage third countries from supporting such programs. With this in mind, the United States also
realizes that there is strong public support for the nuclear weapons program in both ofthe
63 Statement of the Joseph Nye, Asst. Secretary ofDefense, before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia, March 9, 1995.
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democracies ofIndia and Pakistan. To overcome this obstacle, the United States looks for ways to
have the political elites of both countries inform their public of the risks and costs of maintaining
nuclear weapons. 64
To reduce tensions between India and Pakistan the DOD specifically has chosen a strategy
to build trust and cooperation between the United States and India and the United States and Pakistan
through military to military ties. The DOD through military ties hopes to build a healthy strategic
relationships by emphasizing shared interests and defense cooperation with each country. To build
trust between the two countries, the United States intends to help both sides understand each others
defense policies and strategic intentions. The pentagon feels by creating transparency in both
Pakistan and India's defense strategy, planning, programs and defense budgets will increase stability
and reduce tensions between the two adversaries. To this end in Pakistan, the DOD has revived a
defense consultative-group that will at least exchange information about defense policies and planning
between the United States and Pakistan. Another area in which the United States hopes to reduce
tensions and build trust between the United States and each country is through international
peacekeeping operations. DOD currently feels that the uniqueness of the peacekeeping arena
provides a means not only to hold United States bi-Iateral military exercises with each country, but
in the peacekeeping arena, a chance for a U.S. led trilateral exercise may exist that should build
mutual trust and confidence between India and Pakistan.65
64 Statement ofRobin Raphael, Assistant Secretary of State, before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Subject: South Asian Proliferation Issues, March 9, 1995.
65 Prepared remarks ofWilliam 1. Perry to the Foreign Policy Association, "Establishing
strong Security Ties With India and Pakistan," Defense Issues (31 Jan 1995) 10 no. 10.
/defenselink/ internet via WWW.
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While the DOD appears to favor a slow, controlled approach to reduce tensions and build
confidence between India and Pakistan through military to military ties, the U.S. State Department
appears to be open and _ready to discuss any option to achieve a breakthrough in nuclear
nonproliferation in South Asia. While the United States appears uninterested in discussing nuclear
nonproliferation in the global context that India desires, it has strongly supported regional and extra-
regional dialogues that Pakistan has proposed. While India remains steadfast in its position of
discussion ofthe issue only at the global level, the United States has become frustrated in its attempts
to persuade Pakistan and India to move simultaneously toward nuclear disarmament. Within this
context, in April of 1994, the U. S. State Department initiated a proposal to entice Pakistan to
unilaterally cap their nuclear program. Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary ofDefense, proposed
to seek a one time waiver of the Pressler Amendment from Congress in order to release 38 F-16
aircraft to Pakistan in exchange for verifiable capping ofPakistan's nuclear program. The proposal
was ultimately shelved because ofPakistan's unwillingness to allow on site inspections of its nuclear
facilities and Pakistan's unwillingness to roll back its nuclear program unilaterally without a
corresponding Indian move. 66
The United States has realized that the-underlying cause for the nuclear stalemate in South
Asia is the difference in perceptions ofall three parties concerning the immediate needs and long term
effects ofboth countries maintaining a nuclear weapon capability. The drain on scarce resources and
damage to international relationships are acceptable to both India and Pakistan, because they both
66 Tahir Amin, "Pakistan in 1994: The Politics ofConfrontation, II Asian Survey (February
1995) 35 no. 2, 145-146.
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believe that a nuclear option is vital to national security interests.67 Pakistan's leaders currently feel
that because ofthe weakening of their conventional forces as a result of the Pressler Amendment, a
nuclear capability has become much more important in deterring India which is able to maintain
superiority in both conventional and nuclear capability. India, on the other hand, sees a nuclear
capability as a cost effective deterrent against the militarily superior Chinese.68 As both countries
see a nuclear weapon capability as the final arbitrar from a larger regional adversary, the United States
views the capability as undermining each countries security and limiting their options in dealing with
their political differences.69
The Department ofDefense has resigned itselfto believe that the Pressler Amendment is a fact
oflife and not likely to go away. Further, the DOD has explicitly said to India that arms sale are not
going to be on the table in the foreseeable future in spite of trying to forge closer military to military
ties. Against this background the Clinton Administration as late as July 1995 has proposed once
again to seek from Congress a waiver of the Pressler Amendment to deliver more than $1.4 billion
in arms which were frozen by the Pressler Amendment to Pakistan. While the administration is not
proposing delivery of the F-16s (which they hope to sell to a third country enabling Pakistan to
recoup its investment), the equipment does include three P-3 Orion aircraft, Harpoon surface to
surface missiles, Sidewinder air to air missiles, artillery pieces, radar equipment, aircraft spare parts
and rockets for use on the Cobra helicopter. 70 The proposed transfer ofmilitary equipment from
67 Robin Raphael before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (March 9, 1995).
68 William Perry, "Establishing Strong Security Ties With India and Pakistan. "
69 Robin Raphael before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (March 9, 1995).
70 New Delhi, (July 31, 1995), Reuter News Service. Inte-met via WWW.
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the United States in an administration attempt to circumvent the Pressler Amendment provides a basis
for examining the historical debate concerning the Pressler Amendment. The debate has historically




v. HISTORICAL DEBATE CONCERNING THE PRESSLER
AMENDMENT
The historical debate concerning the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
exemplifies the difference in perception ofnational security interests and objectives between the
executive branch and Congress. The rationale used by proponents of sanctions and anns transfers
to Pakistan has evolved since the late 1970s, when sanctions were first used by the United States
against Pakistan in pursuit ofu.s. nuclear nonproliferation goals. In 1995 many in Congress now
view the Pressler Amendment as a highly symbolic piece of legislation that underscores a US.
commitment to nuclear nonproliferation throughout the world. As of September of 1995, the
Executive branch and a growing number in Congress view the Pressler Amendment as a roadblock
to improving U.S.-Pakistan relations. Improving U.S.-Pakistan relations is now seen by the executive
branch and members ofCongress as an essential element to achieve current US. security objectives
in the region.
Originally, the majority ofCongress viewed the Pressler Amendment as an essential tool to
monitor Pakistan's nuclear program. After Pressler sanctions were invoked in 1990, Congress felt that
consistent application ofthe Pressler standard would act as a strong deterrent to other countries who
might seek to develop nuclear weapons. Most recently, the majority ofCongress now views Pressler
as a symbol ofUS. resolve to halt nuclear proliferation throughout the world The executive branch
in contrast has had to deal with the absolutes ofthe Pressler Amendment in the context ofchanging
US. interests and objectives in SouthAsia. The executive branch, unlike Congress, is responsible for
defming and maintaining the scope ofbilateral relationships with countries throughout the world.
Pakistani protests to the United States over non delivery of F-16s and other contracted
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military hardware leaves the executive branch little flexibility to improve relations with Pakistan. In
the debate over the Pressler Amendment, the perceptions of the executive branch have also evolved.
Since the legislation was enacted in 1985, the executive branch rationale for arms transfers has
evolved from arms transfers to prevent Pakistani nuclear weapon development, to arms transfers for
restraint in nuclear weapon development, to finally arms transfers to salvage a severely strained
bilateral relationship with Pakistan. While the majority of Congress has seen the legislation as
necessary to deter or halt other countries from pursuing nuclear weapon development, the executive
branch has found it necessary to try and circumvent the amendment in hopes of improving U.S.-
Pakistan relations. The executive branch views a good bilateral relationship with Pakistan as essential
to achieving both nuclear nonproliferation goals and national security objectives in the region.
A. ORIGINS OF LEGISLATION
In the mid 1970s, Congress became concerned about increasing evidence ofintemational trade
in technologies associated with producing nuclear weapons. At the time, Countries such as Pakistan,
South Korea, Brazil, and Taiwan were considered to be actively engaged in acquiring nuclear weapon
technology. In an attempt to halt such efforts, Congress enacted the Glenn/Symington Amendment
to the FAA. Glenn/Symington provided that countries importing or exporting nuclear weapon
technology would be cut offfrom U.S. economic and military assistance. In 1979, President Carter
invoked the Glenn/Symington Amendment against Pakistan after intelligence information confirmed
that Pakistan was building a secret uranium enrichment facility. 71
11 Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown
Amendment to the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act, 1996.
Letter from Senator John Glenn to President Clinton dated 19 April 95 submitted for the record.
Unpublished transcript retrieved via internet.
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In 1981 Congress allowed President Reagan to waive provisions ofthe FAA in Pakistan's case
In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Presidential power to waive nuclear
nonproliferation provisions was given in section 620E of the FAA for a period of six years. In the
early 1980s, Congress had become impatient with Pakistan's apparent determination to continue the
development of a nuclear weapon option. To deflect congressional suspicion, the Reagan
Administration sought verification from Pakistan that its peaceful nuclear research program did not
accelerate or tum toward weapon development. Verification of Pakistan's peaceful research
objectives was found in Pakistan's agreement to the United States that it would not enrich uranium
past 5%.72 A threshold of uranium enrichment to 5% would preclude Pakistan from fabricating a
nuclear weapon which requires a higher le~el ofenriched uranium metal to assemble the nuclear core
ofa weapon.73 To guard against further nuclear weapon development by Pakistan, Congress passed
subsection (e) to the presidential waiver authority found in section 620E ofthe FAA. Subsection
(e) is specific to Pakistan and requires that the President certify annually to Congress "that Pakistan
does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that proposed aid will reduce significantly the risk
that it will possess one. ,,14
72 Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: An Appraisal," The Nation (Oct 1,
1989).
13 Mushahid Hussain, "Nuclear Issue: Ball is Now in Pakistan's Court," The Nation (Nov
29, 1990) 4.
14 Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff, 2.
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B. ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT
In 1990 President Bush could not certifY that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive
device. On 1 October 1990, all U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan was suspended. Since
the cut offofaid, on three separate occasions the executive branch has attempted to circumvent the
Pressler Amendment. In July 1992 Congress challenged the Bush Administration's interpretation of
the amendment. Congress became concerned when it learned that the executive branch was granting
export licenses to private companies to engage in commercial arms sales to Pakistan. In an effort
to block these sales, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee debated the interpretation of the exact
wording ofthe Pressler Amendment. Proponents ofthe Pressler Amendment argued that the wording
explicitly restricted all arms sales or transfers from the United States. The Bush Administration
contended that granting export licenses under the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act did not
violate the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. Since the Pressler Amendment was
part ofthe Foreign Assistance Act, the executive branch successfully argued that Pressler restrictions
on arms transfers only applied to U. S. government military grants and financing to the government
of Pakistan and did not preclude transactions between government of Pakistan and private U.S.
companies. The executive branch deflected congressional pressure by stipulating that export licenses
would only be granted on a case by case review. Further, the administration contended that licenses
would only be granted for expendable munitions and spare parts for weapon systems already in place
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by the Pakistani military. Using these guidelines, the Bush Administration assured Congress that no
new technology (conventional or nuclear) or weapon system upgrades would be licensed for transfer
to Pakistan.75
In another attempt to circumvent the Pressler Amendment, the State Department in 1994
sounded out members ofCongress on a proposal for a one time waiver ofPressler restrictions. The
proposal would allow the delivery of28 F-16 aircraft from Lockheed to Pakistan. These aircraft were
part of a long standing order, already paid for by Pakistan, but could not be delivered because of
section 620E(e). The State Department's strategy was for Pakistan to halt production of additional
fissionable material in exchange for the aircraft. 76 The proposal was ultimately shelved when
Pakistan showed reluctance to make a unilateral move to cap its program, which also would have
allowed international inspections ofPakistan's nuclear facilities. 77
In 1995 the Brown Amendment to Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act for 1996 represents the Clinton Administration's latest attempt to
circumvent the Pressler Amendment. The Brown Amendment allows for the transfer of arms that
Pakistan had either purchased from Washington or sent to the United States for repair or upgrade
prior to 1 October 1990. Pressler sanctions have precluded the ultimate delivery of this arms
75 Committee on Foreign Relations, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment: Commercial
Sales to Pakistan, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., July 30,1992 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office (GPO), 1992). Pages 3-5 refer to the argument given for a broad interpretation of
the Pressler Amendment to cover private sales ofarms to Pakistan. Pages 93-97 summarize the
Bush Administration's interpretation of the Pressler Amendment and its applicability to private
sales of arms to Pakistan.
76 Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff, 1.




C. HISTORICAL RATIONALE FOR SANCTIONS











Since the Pressler Amendment was enacted in 1985, the debate over the Pressler Amendment
Equipment
Table 1. Proposed U.S. Arms Transfer Package for Pakistan.78
The initial rationale for sanctions against Pakistan is found in the wording ofthe legislation
- P-3C-II Orion maritime Patrol and strike
aircraft
- Harpoon anti-ship missiles
- Aim-9L sidewinder air to air missiles
- C-nite night-sighting and targeting
kits for Cobra helicopters
- M-198 towed howitzers
- AN/TPQ 36 artillery-locating radar
- ANIALQ-131 jamming pods for F-16s
- F-16 engines, spares and support
systems
- Tow 2A missiles for Cobra helicopters
package presented in the Table 1 below. While this package does not include the controversial F-
16's, congressional proponents ofthe Pressler Amendment see this possible transfer ofweapons as
undermining the legislative goal of nuclear nonproliferation.
into the changing rationale for and against Pressler.
has displayed a changing rationale for and against sanctions directed at Pakistan. An analysis of
itself During the 1980s military and economic aid was granted to Pakistan for two reasons. First,
the Reagan Administration wanted to get the Soviets out ofAfghanistan. The Reagan administration
congressional debate, concerning attempts to circumvent the Pressler Amendment, provides insight
also argued that assistance would recognize Pakistan's security needs which ultimately would negate
their pursuit of a nuclear weapon capability. Within this framework, the Reagan Administration
justified aid to Pakistan as a tool of nuclear nonproliferation policy. The $4 billion in aid from the
United States to Pakistan during this period was granted as Congress allowed repeated presidential
waivers ofthe nuclear provisions ofthe FAA. Concerned with reports throughout the early 1980s that
Pakistan was still pursuing a nuclear option, Congress enacted the Pressler Amendment which
transferred the "burden oftruth" to the President to demonstrate that aid to Pakistan was "reducing
significantly the risk" that Pakistan would pursue a nuclear weapons program.79 When President
Bush invoked sanctions against Pakistan in 1990, proponents ofthe Pressler Amendment pointed to
the failed logic in an arms for nuclear restraint policy that the Reagan and Bush Administrations had
followed. For Congress, the Pressler Amendment provided the litmus test to the success or failure
of the Reagan and.Bush nonproliferation policies.
In 1992, as the Senate debated the interpretation of the Pressler Amendment, Senator Glenn
saw military transfers to Pakistan as "grasping at straws to perpetuate the myth that arms transfers
could buy US. influence over Pakistan." Senator Glenn also felt that any transfer of spare parts for
F-16s, a known delivery platform for nuclear weapons, would only enhance Pakistan's nuclear strike
capability.80 At the same time, Senator Pressler argued that sanctions against Pakistan could not be
lifted because US. aid in the "new world order" had to be contingent on human rights, development
of democracy, development offree enterprise and for countries to spend less on defense. Linking
US. aid as a tool of nuclear nonproliferation policy was viewed by Senator Pressler as essential to
79 Senator Glenn, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 21-23.
80 Senator Glenn, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 24-25.
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discouraging newly independent republics from the Soviet Union and other non nuclear states from
seeking a nuclear option.81 In 1992, the Pressler Amendment moved from being the litmus test to
the success or failure of executive branch nonproliferation policy, to legislation designed to deter
other countries from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Senator Glenn summed up this
transition to global deterrence when he stated:
Congress cannot legislate away another nations nuclear program. However, America
is under no obligation to make it any easier for a nation to acquire or enhance such
a capability, and in fact, we have a moral and legal duty to make such pursuits quite
costly.82
The 1994 deal involving delivery ofF-16's to Pakistan in exchange for Pakistani nuclear
restraint was never formally debated in Congress. Possibly the greatest obstacle to overcome in the
1994 proposed waiver would be the symbolic nature the F-16 has taken on since Pakistan's acquiring
ofan "explosive nuclear device." Since Pakistan at this time was considered as nuclear weaponized
state in U.S. policy, F-16s were viewed as the primary delivery vehicle for a Pakistan bomb. In 1992,
Senator Glenn provided nine conflicting reports from the Reagan and Bush Administrations as to
whether the F-16s Pakistan currently held were capable of delivering a nuclear device. 83 An F-16
transfer in 1994 would contradict all nuclear nonproliferation goals by providing Pakistan with what
Congress then viewed as a primary nuclear strike vehicle.
In September 1995, the proposal for a one time transfer ofarms not including F-16s has taken
on a new context for proponents of continued sanctions. The recent debate has moved the Pressler
81 Senator Pressler, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 8.
82 Senator Glenn, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 32.
83 'Senator Glenn, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 46-47.
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Amendment from being a tool to deter other nations from developing nuclear weapons to become
a symbol ofAmerican resolve concerning nuclear nonproliferation. Senator Pressler now argues that
a waiver ofsanctions against Pakistan sends the wrong signal to other countries and undermines US.
nuclear nonproliferation policy. Senator Pressler argues that by giving Pakistan arms now, the United
States would be sending other nations the message that "nuclear proliferation pays." To Senator
Pressler, any transfer ofarms at this stage would set a terrible precedent for any future US. nuclear
nonproliferation efforts throughout the world. 84
Senator Glenn in September 1995 expressed that the state ofPakistan can no longer be trusted
by the United States. Glenn argues that throughout the 1980s the United States had kept its part of
the bargain, but were let down by the Pakistanis who used American tax dollars to finance a nuclear
weapons program. The latest arms package consisting of spare parts and reliability upgrades for the
F-16 would only increase the capability ofPakistanis nuclear delivery vehicle. Glenn emphasized that
in 1995 the "underlying fundamental issue is whether the United States has a nonproliferation policy
or not.,,85
Proponents of sanctions in the 1995 debate have also introduced new issues in support of
continued sanctions. Members ofCongress now feel the need to consider balance ofpower in South
Asia and the destabilizing effect ofintroducing more u.S. weapons into the region. Senator Pressler
feels that introduction ofUS. military hardware could "spark a renewed arms race between India and
Pakistan." Senator Pressler further stated that in addition to reliability upgrade for F-16s, the transfer
84 Senator Pressler, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate
concerning the Brown Amendment.
85 Senator Glenn, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning
the Brown Amendment.
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of additional P-3s with Harpoon missiles would allow Pakistan greater strike and surveillance
capabilities. Citing sources in the Indian government, Senator Pressler contends that India would have
no choice but to procure additional military equipment ifthe transfer goes through86. Senator
Feinstein also cited a transfer ofanns at this time could provoke India to deploy the Prithvi missile,
heightening border tensions in an already unstable region. 87
SenatorPressler feels relaxationofthe Pressler sanctions could also inadvertently improve the
"terrorist" state ofIran's military capability. Pressler noted reports indicating cooperative nuclear
weapons development between Iran and Pakistan has been underway for nearly a decade. With Iran
and Pakistan already conducting joint naval maneuvers, data from P-3 surveillance of the Indian
Ocean would be ofcritical use to Iran as they seek to expand their naval power in the region. 88
D. RATIONALE FOR ARMS TRANSFERS
As previously stated, there were two reasons for anns transfers to Pakistan during the 1980s.
First the Reagan and Bush administrations felt that arms transfers would recognize the legitimate
defense concerns ofPakistan. These defense concerns were identified as the threat from the Soviet
invasion ofMghanistan, as well as the threat that India posed to Pakistan. Second, anns transfers
were considered to reduce the risk that Pakistan would pursue a nuclear option ifPakistan had access
to sophisticated U.S. military equipment.
86 Senator Pressler, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning
the Brown Amendment.
87 Senator Feinstein, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate
concerning the Brown Amendment.
88 Senator Pressler, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning
the Brown Amendment. -
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Since U.S. sanctions were invoked in 1990, the rationale for arms transfers has taken on new
dimensions. First, proponents for arms transfers have come to the realization that Pakistan does
indeed have a nuclear capability and is not likely to give it up in the near future. Second, proponents
of arms transfers are assessing the costs sanctions have imposed on U.S.-Pakistan relations.
In 1992 Senator Lugar argued that the United States has to step back and look at what are
U.S. goals in nuclear nonproliferation. While Lugar stated the goal should be to decrease nuclear
proliferation in South Asia, the United States must assess the tools available to reaching this goal.
Senator Lugar agreed that the cut-offof aid is a tool toward nonproliferation, but it should not be
considered the ultimate goal. What Lugar feels needs to be examined is the reasons for nuclear
proliferation in South Asia and whether the cut-off ofarms transfers to Pakistan furthers the goal of
nuclear nonproliferation in the subcontinent. Lugar cited Pakistan's nuclear program was a result of
the search for a force multiplier in light of their conventional weakness. While Pakistan's force
multiplier found in nuclear weapons is similar to the rationale applied by both the United States and
the Soviet Union after WWII, sanctions may be pushing Pakistan to further their nuclear capabilities
which would not be consistent with U.S. goals in the region.89
The proposed transfer ofF-16s in 1994 displayed a new rationale for arms transfers.
The new rationale displayed a realization that sanctions alone would not reverse Pakistan's nuclear
aspirations. The offer ofa "carrot" when all the United States offered through Pressler was a "stick"
both recognized Pakistan's legitimate defense concerns vis-a- vis India, and the deteriorating
Pakistani conventional forces that could push them closer to nuclear weapon dependance. The
fiustrations oftrying to move India and Pakistan simultaneously toward nuclear restraint forced the
89 Senator Lugar, Interpreting the Pressler Amendment, 2-3.
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United States to seek a long shot strategy oftrying to get Pakistan to make a unilateral move. With
little leverage to influence India, the United States once again sought an arms transfer to influence
Pakistan. Unlike the Reagan and Bush rationale to reduce the risk nuclear weapon development, the
1994 proposal sought an arms transfer to freeze and verifY an established nuclear weapon program.
Presently the debate concerning the Brown Amendment focuses primarily on the deterioration
ofUS.-Pakistan relations as a result offour years ofUS. aid sanctions. With little hope of repealing
the Pressler Amendment, proponents of a one time arms transfer feel it is necessary to improve
severely strained US.-Pakistan relations. Sanctions at this time are considered by some in Congress
to be hindering US. efforts to support the democratically elected government ofBenazir Bhutto and
forestalling cooperative programs between the US. and Pakistan concerning countemarcotics and
counterterrorism. Proponents ofthis one time arms transfer have also had to address attacks against
the trustworthiness ofPakistan and balance of power considerations in South Asia.
Senator Mikulski believes that the long standing dispute over the delivery of military hardware
is hindering US. efforts to build strong ties with Pakistan, which she views as crucial to improving
our security and furthering U.S. interests in South Asia. Mikulski feels it is critical for the United
States to support the Bhutto government at this time. Mikulski argues that Prime Minister Bhutto
has transformed Pakistan from a military dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy. Despite Pressler
sanctions, Bhutto has proven to be an ally against terrorism and stemming the flow of narcotics from
South Asia while liberalizing the Pakistani economy, which are all in the interests of the United States
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at this time. Senator Mikulski feels that irnproved human rights, nonproliferation and greater trade
and investment are being held hostage by this "largely symbolic issue. ,,90
Senator Brown feels that the honor of the United States is at stake over a willingness by
Congress not to honor a contractual agreement it made with Pakistan prior to sanctions being
invoked. While Pakistan looks at the non delivery of F-16s, paid for by Pakistan, as the most
inflammatory issue, Senator Brown only argues for a disposition ofparts and unrepaired equipment
that will help restore U.S. credibility to the Pakistani people. To Senator Brown it is a matter of
simple fairness, the United States either must return the Pakistani money or deliver the equipment.91
To combat accusations against the trustworthiness ofPakistan, Senator Brown offered
a history ofU.S.-Pakistan relations recounting the numerous times that Pakistan faced the threat of
Soviet aggression because of their relations with the United States. From Gary Power's U-2 flight
being shot down over the Soviet Union after launching from Peshawar, to Pakistan's role in
supporting the Mghan resistance, Senator Brown feels the Pakistanis took considerable risks at the
request of the United States.92
In 1995 proponents of a one time arms transfer offered a response to balance of power
considerations. Statements from Stephen Cohen (director ofPrograms in Arms Control, University
ofIllinois) and George Tanham (Vice President ofRand Corporation) expressed that the proposed
90 Senator Mikulski, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate
concerning the Brown Amendment.
91 Senator Brown, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning
the Brown Amendment.
92 Senator Brown, Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning
the Brown Amendment.
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arms package would not change the balance at all since there is no balance now. India currently
dominates the region with at least a two to one superiority in all categories of conventional arms.
James Clad, a professor from Georgetown, points to an arms transfer as providing the United States
an opportunity to "provide an equalizing hand in the subcontinental mismatch of conventional
weaponry." Clad stated regardless if there was a relaxation ofPressler standards or not, India is
searching at present for substantial arms purchases including very high technology MIG aircraft.93
Proponents ofboth sanctions and arms transfers offer compelling arguments to further U.S.
interests in South and Southwest Asia. The Pressler Amendment has become a symbol of American
resolve to halt nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The global context Pressler has taken on
undermines U.S. efforts to address critical regional interests and objectives. Containing Iran and Iraq
and pursuing nuclear nonproliferation goals in the region require the United States improve relations
with Pakistan. Proponents of sanctions must consider what are the immediate and possible long term
costs to U.S. national security objectives in the region from continued adherence to Pressler
standards that ultimately equate to strained U.S.-Pakistan relations.
93 Congressional Record, 20 September 1995. Senate debate concerning the Brown
Amendment.
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VI. THE PRESSLERAMENfiMENT AND THE U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY
As the debate concerning the Pressler Amendment continues, conflict between the Pressler
Amendment and the u.s. national security strategy creates immediate and possible long term costs
to u.s. foreign policy objectives in South and Southwest Asia. To accurately assess these costs, it is
necessary to evaluate historical Pakistani foreign relations, especially with the United States, in the
context ofcmrent U. S. andPakistani security interests and objectives. To date, U.S. sanctions against
Pakistan have not persuaded Pakistan to abandon its nuclear weapons development program..
Continued sanctions leave Pakistan with few options to address their own security concerns vis-a-vis
India. It is the pursuit ofthese options that will most likely move Pakistan to counter U.S. interests
in the region. Instead ofcooperative relations with the United States, continued sanctions may push
Paltistan to become a state requiring a u.s, policy ofconfrontation and containment.
Since becoming an independent state in 1947, Pakistan's security concerns have not
significantly changed. Both during and after the u.S.-Soviet cold war, Pakistan remains threatened
from the militarily superior India. In the post cold war era, Pakistan continues to seek alignments with
other countries in order to receive economic and military aid to deter Indian aggression. Pakistan's
recent foreign policy efforts display a country whose threat bas not changed, but historical alignments
and alliances have been undermined with the demise ofthe Soviet Union. Without a Soviet threat in
South Asia, neither the United States nor China appears willing to become deeply involved with
Pakistan due to the risks ofbecoming embroiled in the Indo-Pak dispute. During the cold war, tilting
toward India or Pakistan at the expense ofrelations with the other state was acceptable to the United
States based on the Soviet threat to the region. Now both the United States and China apparently are
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and China apparently are not willing to sacrifice relations with India, due to its size and the economic
potential of the Indian market. Chinese and Indian efforts to demarcate the border and increase
bilateral trade, while the United States seeks balanced ties with India and Pakistan, all point to a new
balance of power in South Asia that Pakistan is trying to adjust to.
The Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act represents a U.S. congressional
perception of an absence of threat to U.S. interests in the region. Without a clear and identifiable
threat such as Soviet expansion, the U. S. geopolitical objective of nuclear nonproliferation has risen
to drive U.S. relations with Pakistan. The Pressler Amendment, which became law in 1985,
prioritizes nuclear nonproliferation goals over Pakistan's geostrategic value to US. regional security
objectives. Throughout the cold war, the status of U.S.-Pakistan relations was defined by the
amount ofconcrete military aid Pakistan would receive from the United States. Historically, when
the United States would cut off military aid, Pakistan would make a pragmatic adjustment in its
foreign policy to counter the persistent threat a more powerful India represented to their national
security. Pakistani shifts in foreign policy would often run counter to US. interests in the region.
The Pressler Amendment and China's reevaluation offoreign policy objectives after the end ofthe
cold war has left Pakistan both militarily and politically isolated in the region. Pakistan's recent
moves toward the CAR and attempts to create a broad based economic and political base by uniting
the Islamic countries ofSouthwest and Central Asia could run counter to US. interests and objectives
in the region.
A. IMMEDIATE COSTS
The immediate conflict between the Pressler Amendment and US. national security objectives
is rooted in the geostrategic significance Pakistan has taken on in the post-cold war world. To be an
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effective strategy for containment ofIran and Iraq, CENTCOM has to consider inclusion ofPakistan.
Pakistan, because of its location, selVes as the eastern flank in the CENTCOM containment strategy.
The Pressler Amendment currently thwarts the CENTCOM strategy to strengthen PakistanIs
military for participation in collective defense efforts in Southwest Asia. Pressler, by barring all
military sales from the United States to Pakistan has decreased the mission readiness of the Pakistani
forces. Since the preponderance ofPakistan's current arms were procured from the United States,
Pakistan lacks the ability to procure the spare parts to maintain this combat equipment, and the ability
to upgrade or modernize their current inventory of weapons. While Pakistan contributed two
brigades to the coalition forces during Desert Storm, the state of their current conventional forces
would limit their ability to serve in future coalitions against threats to U.S. interests in Southwest
Asia.94
The Pressler Amendment also precludes Pakistan from being able to participate in the United
States sponsored International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. This program is
considered critical by the DoDin their efforts to reduce tensions and create transparency between the
militaries of Pakistan and India. While the Pressler Amendment does not bar members of the
Pakistani military from receiving advanced education in the United States, it does not allow the
DoDto fund these students. With costs ofthis program nearly $100,000 per student, the Pakistanis
are not able to take advantage ofthese courses.
While the Pressler Amendment does not bar the United States from pre-positioning combat
equipment in Pakistan, current Pakistani domestic support for U.S. access in Pakistan would
probably be weak because of the Pressler Amendment. On a recent trip to Pakistan, Secretary of
94 Statement ofJoseph Nye before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 9, 1995.
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Defense Perry noted that everyone from taxicab drivers to schoolchildren were well versed in the
details of the Pressler Amendment. Domestic support for the United States in Pakistan has taken
a downward trend as the Pakistani people are "mad as hell" about Pressler.95
The United States also wants to support moderate Islamic countries, especially ones like
Pakistan which are considered democratic and making significant progress to a more open market
based economy. Historically, the tenure of leaders in Pakistan has been influenced by the ability of
the leader to provide a credible defense to deter Indian aggression while simultaneously increasing
the welfare of the people. The Pressler Amendment undermines the Pakistani leader's ability to
provide both a credible defense and improve the welfare of the people. Since the majority of
Pakistani weapons are from the United States, Pakistan's ability to maintain and upgrade these
weapons is negated by Pressler. Pakistan is often accused of spending to much ofits national income
on defense, which ultimately impedes economic growth. Without the ability to obtain spare parts
or upgrade kits for its existing weapon systems, Pakistan will ultimately increase defense expenditures
by buying complete new weapon systems on the open market since their U.S. inventory is becoming
obsolete.
Concerning nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the Pressler amendment currently
undermines U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to roll back its nuclear weapons program. The United
States perceives a nuclear weaponized subcontinent as unstable. In contrast, the Pakistanis conclude
that a nuclear capability is even more important in maintaining their security since the Pressler
95 Remarks of William Perry, "Establishing Strong Security Ties With India and
Pakistan."
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Amendment has significantly weakened Pakistan's conventional forces. Under the current situation
both the Pakistan military and civilian leadership are emphatic in stating that Pakistan should not give
up its nuclear capability.96
B. LONG TERM COSTS
The Pressler Amendment, which precludes better U.S.-Pakistan relations, could have negative
long term effects on U.S. interests in Southwest Asia. By denying Pakistan military aid, the United
States effectively has pushed Pakistan closer to Iran. Instead of containing Iran, the Pressler
Amendment actually may create or expand an Iranian sphere of influence in the region. As the
Pakistanis reach out to both Iran and the CAR, the United States is risking the creation of a anti-
western Islamic block of countries near the entrance to the Persian Gulf While the United States is
concerned about Iran's recent fortifications in the Straits ofHormuz and purchases ofmore modern
weapon systems, the Pressler Amendment offers the United States little leverage to control both the
type and amount of arms now entering the region. As Pakistan is pushed closer to Iran, the threat
of Pakistan transferring nuclear weapon technology to Iran will also increase.
The Pressler Amendment, designed to stop Pakistani nuclear aspirations, has actually
replicated the state ofU.S.-Pakistan relations following the 1971 war that led Pakistan's original quest
for a nuclear weapon capability. Now, as in the early 1970's, Pakistan sees a U.S. President severely
constrained by Congress to aid Pakistan. Even an attempt by the Clinton Administration to receive
a one time waiver ofPressler, fall well short of what the Pakistan requires now. With a weakening
ofconventional forces due to Pressler, Pakistan is unable to give up its nuclear option. To substitute
96 Remarks of William Perry, "Establishing Strong Security Ties With India and
Pakistan."
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a credible conventional deterrent in place ofa nuclear deterrent for Pakistan requires Pakistan have
full access to the U.S. arms market. The effectiveness of modern U.S. weapons systems was well
documented and viewed by the world during Desert Storm. Smart bombs and a night vision
capability were critical to the coalition victory in Kuwait. Access to the most modern weapon
systems may provide the impetus the Pakistani leadership requires to more aggressively work to
justify capping its nuclear weapon program to the Pakistani people.
The United States during different periods of the cold war sought to win the alignment of
India. India due to its population and democratic government was often viewed by the United States
as the geopolitical prize in the cold war battle for influence in South Asia. These Indo-centric views
have surfaced again in the post cold war era due to the size and potential of the emerging Indian
economy. This emphasis, which both the west and China appear to want to cultivate, disregards the
geostrategic importance ofPakistan to U.S. national security strategy in Southwest Asia concerning
containment ofIran and Iraq. Pakistan serving as the eastern flank to this containment strategy could
become a frontline state once again for the United States. Pressler undermines Pakistan's
participation as a friendly nation since the United States would be unable to provide security
assistance to a level which would allow Pakistan to become an effective member in this cooperative
defense agreement. The Pressler Amendment, which has severely constrained US.-Pakistan relations
in the post cold war era, impedes the United States from achieving national security objectives in the
regIon.
C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The DoD has initiated a unique strategy to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan. The
DoD strategy is a gradualist approach based upon first achieving strong bilateral military to military
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contacts with both India and Pakistan. Defense consultative groups, engaged in both countries, will
in the long run provide each side the confidence building measures now absent in the subcontinent
to decrease the likelihood of a rapid escalation of tensions that could lead to a nuclear exchange.
Without the competition from the Soviet Union in the region, the United States chances to achieve
balanced relations with both countries is greatly improved. The success of achieving balanced
relations with both India and Pakistan however, is contingent on both Pakistan and India perceiving
a level playing field as the United States shifts policy in the region.
Currently, Pakistan seeks recognition from the United States that Pakistan is an influential
state in the region whose interests in world affairs and South Asia are similar to U.S. interests and
objectives. Pakistani participation in 1JN peacekeeping operations, joint counterterrorism and
countemarcotic efforts with the United States, reforming the Pakistani economy, and support ofU.S.
efforts for multilateral dialogue in the region concerning nuclear weapons all point to a consensus of
threat between the United States and Pakistan that often was absent during the cold war. A new
consensus ofthreat between Pakistan and the United States lays the foundation for what should be
a close cooperative bilateral relationship. Current U.S.-Pakistan relations and ultimately bilateral
cooperation is impeded by the Pressler Amendment. Without access to U.S. arms, Pakistan does
not perceive a level playing field with the militarily superior India in U.S. foreign policy. The Pressler
Amendment politically tilts U.S. efforts in favor of India.
To correct this impediment to U.S. efforts to achieve balanced ties, the Pressler Amendment
should be repealed. The Pressler Amendment has become a symbol of American resolve to halt
nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The symbolic global context that the Pressler Amendment
has taken on conflicts with U.S. regional interests. U.S. security strategy in the region requires
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cooperative bilateral relations throughout the regIOn. The symbolic nature of the Pressler
Amendment negates the potential gains of close U.S. relations with Pakistan. Senator Glenn was
correct when he stated that Congress could not legislate away a country's bomb program, but
Congress can make it costly. Despite Pressler sanctions, Pakistan has not taken significant steps
toward capping or reducing its nuclear weapon program. The greatest irony in Senator Glenn's
words is that adherence to Pressler standards in U.S. relations with Pakistan ultimately costs the
United States, as Pressler serves as a roadblock to achieve national security objectives in the region.
The current arms package including F-16s should be delivered to Pakistan. The delivery
of this weapons package would send Pakistan the signal that the United States recognizes both
legitimate Pakistani security concerns and the influential role that Pakistan can serve in the South and
Southwest Asia. Pakistan must understand that the transfer of this weapons package does have
strings attached. The United States needs to emphasize that further arms transfers will be considered
in the context ofPakistani efforts toward cooperative defense of the Middle East, participating in
U.S. efforts to reduce tensions in the Indian subcontinent and gradual steps toward nuclear
nonproliferation.
The U.S. defense consultative groups working in both Pakistan and India can play an active
role in precluding an Indo-Pak arms race as a result ofrenewed U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan. High
level military to military contacts between the United States and Pakistan and the United States and
India were never present during the cold war to produce transparency and confidence building
measures necessary to reduce tensions and preclude arms races between India and Pakistan. Indian
objectives to this transfer should be addressed through the defense consultative group as essential
to achieving common U. S. and Indian interests, specifically defense of the Middle East and the
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creation ofa fundamental building block to reduce tensions leading to a more stable region that would
be economically advantageous to India.
Instead ofisolating-Pakistan, the United States needs to elevate Pakistan to a more regional
leadership role in support ofU.S. national security interests and objectives. In this way, Pakistan can
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